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I. INTRODUCTION
When families break apart, it is not uncommon for parents to har-
bor feelings of pain, bitterness, and anger toward their former partners.'
All too frequently, the children become a focal point for continuing the
1. Eg., J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 26 (1980). See, eg., W. HODGES, INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN
OF DIVORCE: CUSTODY, ACCESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 11, 56 (1986).
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battle when the marriage has ended.2 For some parents, the opportunity
to terminate the parental rights of their ex-spouse provides the ultimate
weapon in the arsenal of matrimonial warfare. In the process, children
become innocent victims.
Oklahoma courts have maintained a longstanding practice allowing
one parent to initiate proceedings to terminate the parental rights of the
other parent, typically in divorce or post-divorce actions. In 1985, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court temporarily halted this practice in Davis v.
Davis' on the ground that parents had no statutory authority to seek
such a remedy under existing Oklahoma law. In 1986, the Oklahoma
legislature responded by amending the statute4 which sets forth the
grounds for termination of parental rights in state-initiated juvenile pro-
ceedings. The statute now authorizes a parent or guardian of a child to
file a petition to terminate parental rights upon some of the same
grounds. The legislature's grant of statutory authority remedies the
standing defect underlying the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in
Davis. Nevertheless, serious questions about the wisdom and constitu-
tionality of parent-initiated termination proceedings remain.
Parent-initiated actions to terminate parental rights' deserve special
scrutiny because they differ from terminations in adoption and juvenile
2. See infra notes 228-33. Although post-marital disputes are the context in which the parent-
initiated termination proceedings have been examined by the Oklahoma appellate courts, parent-
initiated proceedings could also involve parents who have never been married to each other.
Although the bulk of psychological research has focused on divorced couples, it is reasonable to
surmise that many of the same psychological forces would affect parents who separated after living
together and their children.
3. 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1985) superseded by statute as stated in L.R.R. v. R.D.R. In re Adop-
tion of R.R.R., 763 P.2d 94, 100 n.18 (1988).
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1987). As amended by the Oklahoma legislature in
1986, § 1130 allowed a parent or guardian to petition to terminate the parental rights of another
parent for any of the grounds available for termination in juvenile proceedings initiated by the state.
In 1987, § 1130 was amended to limit the grounds available to a parent or guardian petitioning for
termination to three. For a discussion of the grounds currently available for parent-initiated termi-
nation, see infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
5. The focus of this article, parent-initiated proceedings to terminate the parental rights of the
other parent, instituted under the authority of OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1987), should be
distinguished from stepparent adoptions. Although the termination of the rights of a parent is fre-
quently accomplished, both involuntarily and voluntarily, in an adoption action brought by the other
parent's new spouse, technically this action is not parent-initiated but stepparent initiated. Under
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 60.3, 60.12 (1981 & Supp. 1987), only the stepparent is eligible to adopt.
Therefore, technically speaking, only the stepparent is a proper petitioner. Nevertheless, since natu-
ral parents have been occasionally included as petitioners in stepparent adoptions, the distinction
should be clarified. Many of the concerns raised in parent-initiated termination proceedings may
also arise in the context of stepparent adoptions. This article's focus, however, is the constitutional-
ity and wisdom of termination proceedings where no one is immediately prepared to assume the
parental role of the terminated parent.
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proceedings in a significant respect. The immediate goal of adoption and
juvenile proceedings is to replace the natural parent or parents with an
adoptive parent or parents in the near future.6 By contrast, no one is
normally waiting to fill the empty parental role following parent-initiated
termination.' This crucial difference raises serious concerns about
whether parent-initiated terminations can ever be justified on the ground
that they serve the interests of the child involved in such a proceeding.8
The circumstances under which parent-initiated terminations arise also
substantially reduce the likelihood that termination is necessary to pre-
vent "imminent or actual harm to the child," a finding recognized by
Oklahoma courts as a constitutional prerequisite to termination of paren-
tal rights.9 Instead of protecting a child from harm or promoting the
child's welfare, the circumstances under which parent-initiated termina-
tions are conducted suggest that such terminations often may be ex-
tremely detrimental to the child involved.10 Given the fundamental
nature of the interests of both the parent facing termination and the
child, the above factors suggest that parent-initiated termination pro-
ceedings are both constitutionally infirm and contrary to a fundamental
tenet of family law that imposes upon the court the duty to act in the best
interests of the child.1 Moreover, parent-initiated termination proceed-
ings under Oklahoma's current legislative scheme bear a tremendous po-
tential for misuse as an additional sanction for nonpayment of support 12
or as simply another weapon to serve the emotional or financial needs of
the parent or parents. 13
Part II of this article provides an overview of the legal effect of ter-
mination of parental rights and compares the grounds and procedural
context of termination in parent-initiated proceedings, juvenile proceed-
ings, and adoptions.
Part III is an examination of the three purposes for which parent-
initiated termination ostensibly has been employed: (1) to protect a child
from harm and promote the child's welfare, (2) to sanction a parent for
6. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. This distinction was emphasized by Justice
Opala in the majority opinion in Davis, 708 P.2d at 1112, in the context of construing legislative
intent and rejecting the 1985 version of § 1130 as a source of authority for private parent.initiated
termination proceedings.
7. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 171-213 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 136-170 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 171-213 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 214-25 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24:299
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nonpayment of support, and (3) to serve the needs of one or both parents.
Initially, the constitutional rights of both a defending parent and the
child involved in a termination proceeding are discussed. The commit-
ment by Oklahoma's courts and legislature to the concept that termina-
tion should only be imposed when it serves the best interests of the child
is then addressed. The part next explores the alternatives that exist to
meet the concerns that parent-initiated termination might legitimately
address and examines the significant detriment to the child that termina-
tion can cause. The conclusion is made that parent-initiated termination
is unnecessary to protect a child from harm and fails to serve a child's
best interests. Examination of the other two purposes suggests that
neither satisfies constitutional requirements nor the public policy concern
that termination serves the interests of the child. Therefore, Oklahoma's
practice of allowing one parent to seek termination of the other parent's
rights outside of juvenile and adoption proceedings should be abolished.
Part IV discusses several important procedural protections guaran-
teed by Oklahoma statute or common law to litigants or the child in
juvenile termination proceedings that have not been addressed by the leg-
islature or the Oklahoma courts in the context of parent-initiated pro-
ceedings." The right of a defending parent to a jury trial, court-
appointed counsel for indigents, and an elevated burden of proof should
be provided regardless of the type of proceeding in which the parent is
threatened with termination. 5 Moreover, the need for independent
counsel for the child, extensive investigation, and expert testimony are at
least as important, and arguably more so, in parent-initiated termination
proceedings. 6 Until parent-initiated proceedings are abolished, these
procedural protections must be guaranteed in order to protect the consti-
tutional rights of the parent whose rights are to be terminated, to protect
the constitutional rights of the child, and to decrease the risk that parent-
initiated termination proceedings will be used for improper purposes.
II. OKLAHOMA'S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
In Oklahoma, termination of parental rights can be accomplished in
three types of proceedings: parent- or guardian-initiated proceedings, 7
14. See infra notes 240-323 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 241-94 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 295-323 and accompanying text.
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (D) (Supp. 1987). See infra note 24 for full text.
1989]
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juvenile proceedings, and adoption proceedings."8 Before exploring these
proceedings in greater depth, it is important to define the scope and effect
of terminating parental rights.
Whether issued in parent-initiated proceedings, juvenile proceed-
ings, or adoption proceedings, an Oklahoma court order terminating pa-
rental rights permanently extinguishes the affected parent's right to
custody of the child, the right to visit the child, the right to control the
child's training and education, the right to earnings of the child, and the
parent's right to inherit from or through the child. 19 Termination of pa-
rental rights does far more, however, than simply terminate all rights the
parent might derive from the parent-child relationship. By statute, ter-
mination of parental rights terminates the parent-child relationship it-
self,20 and thus has the effect of extinguishing the parental duties and
responsibilities created by the relationship. Severance of the parental
bond in termination proceedings therefore terminates not only the rights of
the parent, but also the rights of the child which emanate from the rela-
tionship. Following termination of a parent's rights, the child is deprived
18. Two other types of proceedings which are similar to termination of parental rights are
proceedings to free a child from the parent's dominion pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 9 (1981),
and relinquishment pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 27-31 (1981 & Supp. 1986). Actions to free
a child from a parent's dominion require a showing of abuse of parental authority. Such proceedings
do not contemplate a complete severance of the parent-child relationship, however, as the statute
specifically provides for the subsequent enforcement of the parental duties of support and education.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 27-31 allows parents to voluntarily relinquish their rights and duties
with respect to the permanent care or custody of a child to relatives within the fourth degree without
a court order, and to others pursuant only to a court order. For a discussion of relinquishments in
anticipation of adoption, see infra notes 62 & 67 and accompanying text.
The effect of relinquishments that purport to permanently relinquish all parental rights and
duties, and which are not subsequently followed by an adoption, is unclear. Case law construing the
effect of relinquishment in this context is nonexistent. Title 10, § 31 provides that a parent who
relinquishes care and custody of a child cannot recover custody absent a court finding of neglect of
the child on the part of its foster parents, guardian, or custodian. The fact that the statute does not
require relinquishing parents to adopt back their child suggests that the parental bond is not com-
pletely severed. Cf In re Richmond, 484 P.2d 880, 882 (Okla. 1971) (where mother relinquished
child to Associated Catholic Charities under the Juvenile Code for purposes of adoption, and court
had placed child as ward of court with the agency, court had authority to modify its order upon
mother's request for revocation of consent because mother's rights had not yet been terminated.)
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1132 (1981). See infra note 21 for full text.
20. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has described the purpose of termination proceedings as
severance of the parental bond. Lane v. State (In re T.H.L.), 636 P.2d 330, 332 (Okla. 1981). The
court's most recent pronouncement underscored its finality: Termination of parental rights "is the
unmitigated cessation of all natural and legal rights the parent has in his/her child, and a permanent
parting of all bonds linking parent to child." R.E. v. State (In re A.E.), 743 P.2d 1041, 1047 (Okla.
1987) (footnote omitted).
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of the right to support from that parent,21 as well as the benefits of gui-
dance, companionship, and a continuing social relationship with the par-
ent. Only the right of the child to inherit from the parent is specifically
21. Termination of parental rights is generally regarded throughout the United States as abol-
ishing not only all parental rights, but also all parental obligations including the duty to support the
child. Parker, Dissolving Family Relations: Termination of Parent-Child Relations-An Overview, 11
U. DAYTON L. REv. 555, 556 & n.6 (1986) (excerpted from L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLY & J.
PARKER, FAMILY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1986)). Summarizing the various state termina-
tion statutes, including Oklahoma's, Parker observed that "[t]he only vestiges of the parent-child
relationship that are sometimes statutorily retained are inheritance and religious affiliation." Id. at
557 (footnotes omitted). Of the 28 state statutes Parker summarized, only Arizona explicitly retains
the duty of support past entry of an order terminating parental rights. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-
539 (1974). "An order terminating the parent-child relationship shall divest the parent and the child
of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations with respect to each other except the right of the
child to inherit and support from the parent. This right of inheritance and support shall only be
terminated by a final order of adoption." Id.
Although the Oklahoma statute defining the effect of termination of parental rights, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 1132 (1981), does not specifically address the duty of support, a close reading of this
and corresponding statutes and case law supports the conclusion that the effect of termination of
parental rights in Oklahoma is not intended by the legislature to depart from the generally under-
stood meaning of termination nationwide. Section 1132 provides:
The termination of parental rights terminates the parent-child relationship, including the
parent's right to the custody of the child and his right to visit the child, his right to control
the child's training and education, the necessity for the parent to consent to the adoption of
the child and the parent's right to the earnings of the child, and the parent's right to inherit
from or through the child. Provided, that nothing herein shall in any way affect the right of
the child to inherit from the parent.
Id.
First, the statutory language declaring that "termination of parental rights terminates the par-
ent-child relationship" clearly abrogates the duty of support. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
describing the parental duty to provide children with support and education that is set forth in
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 4 (1981), has specifically declared that this duty arises out of the parent-child
relationship. LeCrone v. LeCrone, 596 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Okla. 1979). The court has also stated that
the "rights and duties of the parents are reciprocal." Green v. Hight (In re Guardianship of Hight),
148 P.2d 475, 480 (Okla. 1944). If the parent-child relationship creates the duty of support, it fol-
lows that severance of the relationship terminates the duty of support.
Second, the specific retention in § 1132 of the child's right to inherit subsequent to termination
suggests that other rights of the child arising out of the relationship are not similarly preserved.
No Oklahoma case authority has been found which recognizes or enforces a duty of support
subsequent to termination of a parent's rights. A recent Oklahoma Supreme Court opinion, Merrell
v. Merrell, 712 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1985), provides by implication further evidence that termination of
parental rights terminates the parent's duty to support. In Merrell the natural father challenged the
lower court's refusal to dismiss an application for contempt citation, despite Merrel's claim that his
duty to pay child support ended in 1977 when a court had declared his child eligible for adoption
without his consent. No final decree of adoption was ever entered. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the declaration of eligibility for adoption without consent did not itself effect a termination
of parental rights, and that only "the decree of adoption itself would terminate the parental rights."
Id. at 37. Since "the 1977 adjudication concerned only petitioner's right to consent to the adoption
of the parties' minor child rather than the full panoply of rights and obligations between petitioner
and the child, it is apparent that the statutory duty to support the minor child continued in force and
effect." Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). The court further reasoned that "[i]f the section 60.7 hearing
had been found to terminate all parental ties to the affected parent, the child would be deprived of
the possibility of support from that parent even though an adoptive parent had not come forth to
take up the burden." Id. The court's equation of termination of parental rights with termination of
7
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preserved by statute following termination proceedings. 22 Thus, termina-
tion of parental fights is a misnomer, for the drastic effect of such an
order is to deny permanently both the parent and, with the exception of a
possible inheritance, the child of any future rights and benefits that could
be derived from a continuation of the relationship.
A. Parent-Initiated Termination Proceedings
1. Involuntary Termination
Involuntary termination of a parent's fights at the instigation of the
other parent is authorized by title 10, section 1130(D) of the Oklahoma
Statutes. Most frequently this remedy is sought by the initiating parent
in a post-decree divorce proceeding or in a separate action initiated after
the divorce of the natural parents.23 Recently amended in 1987, section
1130 now provides that a parent or guardian of a child may petition the
court to terminate the rights of a parent, without that parent's consent,
on two grounds: (a) the parent entitled to custody has abandoned the
child, or (b) the parent without custody has willfully failed to contribute
to the support of the child during the preceding year, as required by
court order or decree, or in the absence of an order, consistent with the
parent's means and earning capacity. 24 The only ground available for
the duty of support in adoption certainly supports the conclusion that a termination of parental
rights under OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 similarly extinguishes the duty to pay child support.
Finally, when the legislature has wanted to make it clear that the duty of support is retained
following court proceedings that deny a particular parental right, it has done so. In OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 60.6 (Supp. 1986), the legislature specifically provided that a court's determination that a child
born out of wedlock could be adopted without the consent of the father or putative father "shall not,
by itself, act to relieve such father or putative father of his obligation" to provide support for the
child. Id. The final decree of adoption terminates the rights and responsibilities of the natural par-
ents. Id. § 60.16 (Supp. 1987). The legislature has not included a similar provision retaining the
duty of support of a parent whose rights have been terminated under tit. 10, § 1130.
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1132 (1981).
23. See McNeely v. Delmer, 734 P.2d 1294, 1295-96 (Okla. 1987) (separate post-divorce termi-
nation action); Griffith v. Griffith, 730 P.2d 524, 525 (Okla. 1986) (post-divorce motion); Davis v.
Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Okla. 1985) superseded by statute as stated in L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In
re R.R.RL), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988) (post-divorce proceeding); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 708
P.2d 1100, 1101 (Okla. 1985) (post-divorce proceeding); In re Boyer, 490 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Okla.
1971) (post-divorce proceeding filed by mother to have both her rights and father's rights terminated
so that children could be placed for adoption); D.S. v. J.H. (In re James), 593 P.2d 1095, 1096 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1978) (separate post-divorce termination action).
24. OKLA. STAT. tit 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1987). The full text of § 1130 provides:
A. The finding that a child is delinquent, in need of supervision or deprived shall not
deprive the parents of the child of their parental rights, but a court may terminate the
rights of a parent to a child in the following situations:
1. Upon a written consent of a parent, including a parent who is a minor, ac-
knowledged as provided in paragraph (4) of Section 60.5 of this title, who desires to
terminate his parental rights; provided that the court finds that such termination is in
the best interests of the child; or
8
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involuntarily terminating the noncustodial parent's rights is thus willful
failure to pay child support during the preceding year.
2. A finding that a parent who is entitled to custody of the child has abandoned
it; or
3. A finding that:
a. the child is deprived, as defined in this chapter, and
b. such condition is caused by or contributed to by acts or omissions of his
parent, and
c. termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, and
d. the parent has failed to show that the condition which led to the making
of said finding has not been corrected although the parent has been given three
(3) months to correct the condition; provided, that the parent shall be given no-
tice of any hearing to determine if the condition has been corrected. The court
may extend the time in which such parent may show the condition has been
corrected, if, in the judgment of the court, such extension of time would be in the
best interest of the child. During the period that the parent has to correct the
condition the court may return the child to the custody of its parent or guardian,
subject to any conditions which it may wish to impose or the court may place the
child with an individual or an agency; or
4. A finding that a parent who does not have custody of the child has willfully
failed to contribute to the support of the child as provided in a decree of divorce or in
some other court order during the preceding year or, in the absence of such order,
consistent with the parent's means and earning capacity; or
5. A conviction in a criminal action pursuant to the provisions of Sections 843,
845, 1021.3, 1111 and 1123 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes or a finding in a
deprived child action either that:
a. the parent has physically or sexually abused the child or a sibling of such
child or failed to protect the child or a sibling of such child from physical or
sexual abuse that is heinous or shocking to the court or that the child or sibling of
such child has suffered severe harm or injury as a result of such physical or sexual
abuse, or
b. the parent has physically or sexually abused the child or a sibling of
such child or failed to protect the child or a sibling of such child from physical or
sexual abuse subsequent to a previous finding that such parent has physically or
sexually abused the child or a sibling of such child or failed to protect the child or
a sibling of such child from physical or sexual abuse; or
6. A conviction in a criminal action that the parent has caused the death of a
sibling of the child as a result of the physical or sexual abuse or chronic neglect of
such sibling; or
7. A finding that all of the following exist:
a. the child is deprived, as defined in this chapter, and
b. custody of the child has been placed outside the home of a natural or
adoptive parent, guardian or extended family member, and
c. the parent whose rights are sought to be terminated has been sentenced
to a period of incarceration of not less than ten (10) years, and
d. the continuation of parental rights would result in harm to the child
based on consideration of the following factors, among others: the duration of
incarceration and its detrimental effect on the parent/child relationship; any pre-
vious incarcerations; any history of criminal behavior, including crimes against
children; the age of the child; the evidence of abuse or neglect of the child or
siblings of the child by the parent; and the current relationship between the par-
ent and the child and the manner in which the parent has exercised parental
rights and duties in the past, and
e. termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.
Provided, that the incarceration of a parent shall not in and of itself be sufficient to deprive
a parent of his parental rights; or
9
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Abandonment,2" the other ground available for involuntary termi-
nation under section 1130(D), applies only to parents "entitled to cus-
tody" of a child. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recently confirmed
that when full legal custody of a child has been awarded to one parent,
the noncustodial parent is not "entitled to custody" within the meaning
8. A finding that all of the following exist:
a. the child is deprived as defined in this chapter, and
b. custody of the child has been placed outside the home of a natural or
adoptive parent, guardian or extended family member, and
c. the parent whose rights are sought to be terminated has a mental illness
or mental deficiency, as defined by paragraphs f and g of Article II of Section 6-
201 of Title 43A of the Oklahoma Statutes, which renders the parent incapable of
adequately and appropriately exercising parental rights, duties and responsibili-
ties, and
d. the continuation of parental tights would result in harm or threatened
harm to the child, and
e. the mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent is such that it will
not respond to treatment, therapy or medication and, based upon competent
medical opinion, the condition will not substantially improve, and
f. termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.
Provided, a finding that a parent has a mental illness or mental deficiency shall not in and
of itself deprive the parent of his parental rights.
B. Unless otherwise provided for by law, any parent or legal custodian of a child
who willfully omits or neglects, without lawful excuse, to perform any duty imposed upon
such parent or legal custodian by law to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medi-
cal attendance for such child, upon conviction, is guilty of a misdemeanor. As used in this
section, the duty to furnish medical attention shall mean that the parent or legal custodian
of a child must furnish medical treatment in such manner and on such occasions as an
ordinarily prudent person, solicitous for the welfare of a child, would provide; such parent
or legal custodian is not criminally liable for failure to furnish medical attendance for every
minor or trivial complaint with which the child may be afflicted. Any person who leaves
the state to avoid providing necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance for
such child, upon conviction, is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in
the State Penitentiary for a period not exceeding one (1) year. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to mean a child is endangered for the sole reason the parent or guardian, in
good faith, selects and depends upon spiritual means alone through prayer, in accordance
with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination for the treat-
ment or cure of disease or remedial care of such child; provided, that medical care shall be
provided where permanent physical damage could result to such child; and that the laws,
rules and regulations relating to communicable diseases and sanitary matters are not vio-
lated. Nothing contained herein shall prevent a court from immediately assuming custody
of a child and ordering whatever action may be necessary, including medical treatment, to
protect his health or welfare. Psychiatric and psychological testing and counseling are
exempt from the provisions of this act.
C. An order directing the termination of parental rights is a final appealable order.
D. A parent or guardian of a child may petition the court to terminate the parental
rights of a parent or the parents of a child for any of the grounds listed in paragraphs 1, 2
or 4 of subsection A of this section. A prior finding by a court that a child is delinquent,
deprived or in need of supervision shall not be required for the filing of such petition by the
parent or guardian. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. The meaning of the term "abandonment" under § 1130 was recently discussed by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in McNeely v. Delmer (In re McNeely), 734 P.2d 1294 (Okla. 1987),
which focused on what abandonment is not:
We are persuaded by the plain language of § 1130(A)(2) and hence hold that a parent like
this mother [a woman whose ex-husband had full formal legal custody of the daughter],
who has not failed to discharge any court-imposed obligation or some well-defined legal
10
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of section 1130 (D) merely because that parent was entitled to visitation.
Thus, a noncustodial parent cannot have his or her parental rights termi-
nated under section 1130(D) based upon abandonment of the parent's
visitation rights.26 Since the vast majority of termination proceedings in-
itiated by parents are brought by custodial parents seeking to terminate
the rights of noncustodial parents,27 the primary ground for parent-initi-
ated involuntary termination actions is willful failure to support.
duty and who bore no custodial responsibility, does not come within the purview of 'aban-
donment' as a statutory ground for parental bond's severance.
Id. at 1297.
An Oklahoma Court of Appeals has defined "abandonment," for purposes of § 1130(B), as "a
conscious disregard of the obligations ... a parent owed her child to such an extent that.. . the
parent-child relationship had been destroyed." The court conceded that the concept of abandon-
ment is "somewhat elastic" and "to a large extent considered a question of fact for trial court deter-
mination." Russell v. O'Neill (In re O'Neill), 554 P.2d 864, 871 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976). O'Neill is the
only reported case in the last 35 years in which abandonment has successfully been used as a ground
in juvenile or parent-initiated terminations. (D.S. v. J.H. (In re James H.), 593 P.2d 1095 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1978) was subsequently withdrawn and disapproved by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See
infra note 26.) In O'Neill, the mother, during a period of separation from her husband, left her child
for over a year with a family the mother barely knew, rarely visited the child, and failed to contribute
to his support. On this basis she was found to have abandoned the child, and her parental rights
were terminated. One judge dissented from the finding that the mother's conduct constituted aban-
donment, on the ground that the mother had requested the return of the child in an earlier action,
although she had voluntarily given the child back to petitioners within several days, and on another
occasion had requested his return.
26. McNeely v. Delmer (In re McNeely), 734 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Okla. 1987). In McNeely, the
custodial father attempted to terminate the parental rights of his ex-spouse on grounds of abandon-
ment, since she had visited her daughter only twice in eleven years. The court found she was not
entitled to custody within the meaning of § 1130(A)(2). See supra note 25. The court withdrew and
disapproved an earlier decision, D.S. v. J.H. (In re James H.), 593 P.2d 1095 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978),
in which the parental rights of a noncustodial mother were terminated on grounds of abandonment
because she did not visit or contact the child for a period of over six years. The court found in In re
James H. that although the mother was not the parent with custody since the divorce, she was
"entitled to custody" within the meaning of § 1130(A)(2) because her parental rights had not been
terminated and she had been entitled to visitation. The court's opinion relied upon an earlier
Oklahoma Supreme Court opinion, In re Boyer, 490 P.2d 1076 (Okla. 1971), in which the words,
"entitled to custody," were interpreted by the court more expansively, applying to any parent whose
parental rights had not been terminated or relinquished. The court in Boyer, however, was interpret-
ing the original 1968 version of § 1130 in which a parent "entitled to custody" could have his or her
rights terminated for willful neglect to provide the child with support or education. Revisions of
§ 1130, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's withdrawal In re James H., and the court's finding that the
noncustodial mother in McNeely was a parent not "entitled to custody" compel the conclusion that
the earlier broad definition of "entitled to custody" has been rejected by the court. Thus, under the
current § 1130(A)(2), when custody of a child has been awarded to one parent, the noncustodial
parent does not fall within the section's purview.
27. All reported parent-initiated termination cases were instituted by custodial parents seeking
termination of noncustodial parents' rights. See McNeely v. Delmer (In re McNeely), 734 P.2d 1294
(Okla. 1987); Griffith v. Griffith, 730 P.2d 524 (Okla. 1986); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 708 P.2d
1100 (Okla. 1985); Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1985) superseded by statute as stated in
L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P2d 94 (Okla. 1988); Mullins v. Mullins, 606 P.2d 573 (Okla.
1980) overruled, Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1985); In re Boyer, 490 P.2d 1076 (Okla.
1971); In re James H., 593 P.2d 1095 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) withdrawn, In re McNeely, 734 P.2d
1294 (Okla. 1987).
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In describing the two statutory grounds available for parent-initi-
ated involuntary termination proceedings, section 1130 does not explic-
itly require that the court find termination to be in the best interests of
the child.28 This omission is anomalous and worrisome. Several of the
grounds for termination listed in section 1130 that are restricted to termi-
nation in juvenile proceedings do specifically require a finding that termi-
nation of parental rights is in the child's best interests.29 The remaining
grounds restricted to juvenile proceedings involve severe or repeated
child abuse.30 While there is authority to support the argument that a
court must always specifically find termination of parental rights to be in
the child's best interest,31 the omission of this requirement is indeed
troubling and could, inappropriately, be taken as a signal that termina-
tion in parent-initiated proceedings could be used to serve other goals. 3 2
2. "Voluntary" Termination
Under section 1130, termination of parental rights in parent-initi-
ated proceedings may also be accomplished by written consent of a par-
ent who desires to terminate his or her parental rights.33 In order to
terminate parental rights based upon the parent's written consent, sec-
tion 1130 requires the court specifically to find that such termination is in
the best interests of the child.
Although "voluntary" terminations are accomplished with the writ-
ten consent of the parent whose rights are forfeited, an examination of
the circumstances under which many consents are signed indicates they
are clearly not "desired" in the true sense of the word. As with involun-
tary termination, termination on the basis of written consent in parent-
initiated proceedings often occurs in the context of divorce or post-di-
vorce proceedings. Frequently consent is obtained after criminal charges
or an application for contempt citation for failure to pay child support
has been filed or threatened against the parent who subsequently signs
the written consent. 34 "Voluntary" is thus an inappropriate description
28. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(2) and (4) (Supp. 1987).
29. Id. § 1130(A)(3), (7), and (8).
30. Id. § 1130(A)(5) and (6).
31. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
32. Most troubling is the temptation to use termination of parental rights to sanction a parent,
see infra notes 214-25 and accompanying text; or to serve the personal interests of the parent initiat-
ing the termination action, see infra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(1) (Supp. 1987). See supra note 24 for full text.
34. No published opinions have been found regarding the circumstances under which these
voluntary consents in parent-initiated proceedings are signed. Based on the author's observations
during practice in Oklahoma, it appears that many parents who consent to a termination of their
[Vol. 24:299
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of many consents that are signed to avoid the prospect of impending im-
prisonment for contempt 35 or criminal failure to support.36
3. Absence of Parental Replacement
Regardless of whether a parent-intiated termination proceeding
brought under section 1130 is involuntary or based upon consent, there is
no requirement that someone be waiting to assume through adoption the
role of the parent whose rights are terminated. There is also no indica-
tion that freeing the child for adoption is a primary purpose of a termina-
tion proceeding in this context.37  Normally these proceedings are
initiated by the custodial parent in an attempt to terminate the parental
rights of the noncustodial parent. They typically occur in an ongoing
divorce or custody action or in a post-decree proceeding.38 If a steppar-
ent were waiting in the wings to adopt the child, there would be no rea-
son to proceed under section 1130 to terminate parental rights and then
bring a separate adoption action. The parties could accomplish the same
result, based on willful nonpayment of support, in a proceeding for step-
parent adoption under the adoption statutes. 39 A child who loses a par-
ent through parent-initiated termination proceedings under section 1130
parental rights do so under the threat of a contempt proceeding for nonpayment of child support.
Frequently the custodial parent threatens to file or does file an application for contempt and agrees
to drop the proceeding if the noncustodial parent will consent to termination of his or her parental
rights.
35. Punishment for indirect civil contempt, which includes failure to pay court ordered child
support, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1291(D) (Supp. 1987), is a fine of up to $500 and/or imprisonment in
the county jail for up to six months. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 566 (Supp. 1984).
36. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130(B) (Supp. 1987) (See supra note 24 for full text), OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 851, 853 (1981), 852 (Supp. 1987).
37. On the other hand, a termination proceeding initiated by a guardian of a child under § 1130
may well be motivated, at least on the part of the guardian, by the desire to free the child for
adoption.
38. See supra notes 23 & 27.
39. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.3 (1981), which provides that the husband or wife of a child's
parent is eligible to adopt the child. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.6 (Supp. 1987) which sets forth the
grounds for determining a child eligible for adoption without the consent of its parent, provides in
relevant part:
A child under eighteen (18) years of age cannot be adopted without the consent of its
parents, if living, except that consent is not required from:
2. A parent who, for a period of twelve (12) months immediately preceding the
filing of a petition for adoption of a child, has willfully failed, refused, or neglected to
contribute to the support of such child:
a. in substantial compliance with a support provision contained in a decree
of divorce, or a decree of separate maintenance or an order adjudicating responsi-
bility to support in a reciprocal enforcement of support proceeding, paternity
action, juvenile proceeding, guardianship proceeding, or orders of modification to
such decree, or other lawful orders of support entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction adjudicating the duty, amount, and manner of support, or
13
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is therefore unlikely to have someone who is immediately prepared to fill
the empty parental role and legally assume the parental obligation to
support the child.
B. Termination of Parental Rights in Juvenile Proceedings
The state may seek to terminate the parental rights of one or both
parents of a child in juvenile proceedings' initiated by the district attor-
ney.41 Before the court may terminate a parent's rights in a juvenile ac-
tion, the court must first adjudge the child a ward of the court on the
grounds that the child is delinquent, deprived, in need of supervision, or
in need of treatment. 2 If the evidence presented at the adjudication
hearing fails to support any of these allegations, the petition initiating the
juvenile proceeding must be dismissed.43 The court has no authority to
issue any order of disposition, including an order terminating parental
rights. If the child is determined to be a ward of the state, a dispositional
hearing is held at which the court takes evidence "helpful in determining
the proper disposition best serving the interest of the child and the pub-
lic" and issues a dispositional order.' Periodic review hearings and dis-
positional hearings must follow if the child is removed from the custody
of the parents.45 Termination of parental rights is one of several orders a
judge may issue at the disposition stage." However, the judge must first
b. according to such parent's financial ability to contribute to such child's
support if no provision for support is provided in a decree of divorce or an order
of modification subsequent thereto; or and where any of the above conditions exist
it shall not be necessary to terminate parental rights under Section 1130 of this title
prior to the adoption of said child. Provided that any decree of adoption hereto.
fore entered by any court of appropriate jurisdiction within the State of
Oklahoma wherein termination of parental rights, as prescribed in Section 1130
of this title, was not obtained shall not be invalid on the ground that such termi-
nation of parental rights was not obtained....
Id. (Emphasis added).
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1116 (Supp. 1986), 1130 (Supp. 1987).
41. Id. § 1103 (Supp. 1982). Juvenile proceedings may also be filed by a person authorized by
court rule to make a preliminary inquiry to determine if further action is necessary. The statute
indicates that the Department of Human Services may contract to perform this preliminary intake.
Id. Regardless of who files the petition, it is the district attorney who must prepare and prosecute
the case. Id. § 1109 (Supp. 1986).
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1114 (Supp. 1986) 1115 (1981). Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102,
1109 (Okla. 1985) superseded by statute as stated in L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94
(Okla. 1988); Marian P. v. State (In re Lyni P.), 626 P.2d 864, 866 (Okla. 1981) overruled on other
grounds by Mann v. Oklahoma Dep't of Instits. (In re Jerry L.), 662 P.2d 1372 (Okla. 1983).
The terms "delinquent child," "deprived child," "child in need of supervision," and "child in
need of treatment" are defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101 (Supp. 1987).
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1113 (1981).
44. Id. § 1115 (1981).
45. Id. § 1116(B) (Supp. 1987).
46. Id. § 1116(A).
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ascertain whether the constitutional47 and statutorya" standards for ter-
mination have been met, the parents have been properly notified,49 and
termination of one or both parents' rights is in the best interests of the
child.50
Termination of parental rights in juvenile proceedings is normally
accomplished with the goal of freeing the child for adoption.51 While an
impending adoption is not a statutory prerequisite to termination in juve-
nile proceedings, the legislative scheme clearly suggests that adoption is
the preferred next step in the disposition of a child following termination
of parental rights. Title 10, section 1116.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes
mandates a review every six months of any dispositional order removing
a child from the custody of its parents "until such time as the child is
returned to the custody of said parent or parents and the conditions
which caused the child to be adjudicated as deprived have been corrected
or the parental rights of said parent or parents are terminated and a final
adoption decreed."52 Title 10, section 1116 further requires that periodic
dispositional hearings be held following the initial dispositional hearing
for any child placed in foster care, at which the court is directed to con-
sider whether "the rights of the parents of the child should be terminated
and the child placed for adoption or legal guardianship."53 Moreover,
title 10, section 1133 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that after termi-
nation of parental rights has taken place, "a court may award custody of
the child to any qualified person or agency with authority to consent to
the adoption of the child, or the court, in its discretion, may reserve the
47. See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
48. The statutory grounds for termination are set forth in title 10, § 1130. See supra note 24 for
full text.
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1116(C) (Supp. 1987) provides that "[tihe court may not terminate
the rights of a parent who has not been notified that the parental rights might be terminated."
50. In William K. v. Rebeeca K. (In re Adoption of A.G.K.), 728 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Okla. Ct. App.
1986), the court concluded that § 1130 vested the court with power to decline to terminate parental
rights even if the statutory grounds were satisfied and that such discretion was granted by § 1130 "to
avoid a termination that the court finds to be contrary to the best interests of the child-the protec-
tion of which is the primary purpose for and paramount objective of all the children-oriented provi-
sions of Title 10." See Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Okla. 1985) superseded by statute as
stated in L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.) ("In short, the entire Juvenile Code must be viewed as
creating public/state remedies to be administered in the best interests of minors who fall within its
contemplation."); In re J.L., 578 P.2d 349, 351 (Okla. 1978).
As previously mentioned, a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of
the child is specifically included as a requirement of several of the statutory grounds under § 1130
(Supp. 1987). See § 1130(A)(1), (3), (7), and (8).
51. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1112.
52. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1116.1(A) (Supp. 1983).
53. Id. § 1116(B) (Supp. 1987).
1989]
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authority to consent to the adoption of the child." 4 In Davis, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he terms of § 1133(A)
clearly indicate that terminating parental rights under § 1130-without
the imminent prospect of adoption-defeats the purpose of the statute."5' 5
Oklahoma's legislative scheme in this regard is in harmony with other
states which have articulated that the goal of termination of parental
rights in juvenile proceedings is to permit a child to be adopted by par-
ents who can provide a stable, loving home environment.5 6
The expanded grounds available for terminating parental rights in
juvenile proceedings are consistent with facilitating this goal. In addition
to the grounds available for parent-initiated termination proceedings-
abandonment, willful failure to support, and consent-section 1130 al-
lows termination in juvenile proceedings on the following grounds: (1)
failure within a three-month period to correct parental conduct which
caused or contributed to an adjudication that the child is deprived;57
54. Id. § 1133(A) (1981).
55. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1112, n.53 (emphasis in original).
56. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(b) (McKinney 1983), which provides, in reference to
termination of parental rights:
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this section to provide procedures not only
assuring that the rights of the natural parent are protected, but also, where positive, nur-
turing parent-child relationships no longer exist, furthering the best interests, needs, and
rights of the child by terminating parental rights and freeing the child for adoption.
Similarly, in In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 840, 662 P.2d 922, 932, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 473 (1983)
Justice Byrd comments in her dissent, "Even a cursory glance through the [California] statutory
scheme (Civ. Code, § 232 et. seq.) reveals a clear legislative intent that parental rights are not to be
terminated unless there is at least some realistic possibility that the child or children will be adopted
thereafter."
This approach to termination has also been recognized by commentators. Parker, supra note
21, at 565-66; See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of'Neglected' Children: Standards for Removal
of Children from their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 691 (1976). Wald suggests that termination of parental
rights should not be permissible where permanent placement is not feasible, and that adoption is the
generally preferred method of permanent placement. Id.
There are rare occasions in which permanent placement can be better accomplished by allowing
foster parents or a relative, with whom the child has been placed and become strongly attached, to
become legal guardians. This occurs in those instances where the relative or foster parents are un-
able, for good reasons, to adopt. See Wald, supra, at 697, 699. Such an alternative allows the child
to continue a relationship with the psychological parents, and provides the child with someone to fill
the parental role under circumstances where the child's needs for emotional and financial support
should be met.
57. "Deprived child" is defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101(4) (Supp. 1987) as follows:
[A] child who is for any reason destitute, homeless, or abandoned or who does not have the
proper parental care or guardianship or whose home is an unfit place for the child by
reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity on the part of his parents, legal guardian, or other
person in whose care the child may be, or who is a child in need of special care and treat-
ment because of his physical or mental condition including a child born in a condition of
dependence on a controlled dangerous substance, and his parents, legal guardian, or other
custodian is unable or willfully fails to provide said special care and treatment, or who is a
handicapped child deprived of the nutrition necessary to sustain life or of the medical
16
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(2) a conviction or finding in a juvenile proceeding of physicial or sexual
abuse of the child or sibling in a heinous or shocking manner or causing
severe harm or injury; (3) a conviction of abuse or neglect which caused
the death of the child's sibling; (4) a sentence of imprisonment for ten or
more years to the parent of a deprived child, if the child has not been
placed with a relative or guardian, and continuation of the parental rela-
tionship would result in harm to the child; or (5) mental illness or retar-
dation of the parent of a deprived child, if the condition will not
substantially improve, the child has not been placed with a relative or
guardian, and continuation of the parental relationship would result in
harm to the child.5 8 The statute specifically requires the court to make a
finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the
child when termination is based on failure to correct deprivation, impris-
onment, or mental illness or retardation. Pursuant to a 1987 amendment
of section 1130, these five grounds were specifically excluded from use in
termination proceedings initiated by parents or guardians outside ofjuve-
nile proceedings.
C. Adoption Proceedings
A final decree of adoption in Oklahoma terminates the relationship
between the natural parents and the adopted child. Hence it extinguishes
all parental rights and responsibilities of the natural parent to the
adopted child.59 An exception applies, of course, to an adoption by a
stepparent. Such an adoption would not terminate or affect the relation-
ship of the natural parent who is the stepparent's spouse at the time of
the adoption.'
treatment necessary to remedy or relieve a life-threatening medical condition in order to
cause or allow the death of said child if such nutrition or medical treatment is generally
provided to similarly situated nonhandicapped or handicapped children, provided that no
medical treatment is necessary if, in the reasonable medical judgment of the attending
physician, such treatment would be futile in saving the life of the child, or who is, due to
improper parental care and guardianship, absent from school for fifteen (15) or more days
or parts of days within a semester or four (4) or more days or parts of days within a four-
week period without a valid excuse as defined by the local school boards if said child is
subject to compulsory school attendance, or whose parent or legal custodian for good cause
desires to be relieved of his custody. No child who, in good faith, is being provided with
treatment and care by spiritual means alone in accordance with the tenets and practice of a
recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall
be considered, for that reason alone, to be a deprived child pursuant to any provision of
Sections 1101 through 1506 of this title. The phrase dependent and neglected shall be
deemed to mean deprived.
Id.
58. See supra note 24 for full text of § 1130.
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16(1) (Supp. 1984).
60. Id. § 60.16(2).
1989]
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Because adoptions are permitted without the consent of a natural
parent under certain circumstances, the adoption statutes provide an-
other opportunity for involuntary termination of parental rights. A child
may be adopted without the consent of a natural parent if the parent, for
a twelve month period immediately preceding the filing of the adoption
action, willfully fails to pay child support in substantial compliance with
a court order or, if no order exists, according to the parent's financial
ability.61 Unless the parent's rights have been previously terminated in
some other proceeding,62 no other ground is available for adoption of a
child of a marriage6 ' without the natural parent's consent. Similarly, the
mother of a child born out of wedlock," whose rights have not previ-
ously been terminated, cannot involuntarily lose her parental rights
through adoption on any other ground. A father of a child born out of
wedlock, however, may have his rights terminated involuntarily through
adoption without his consent if he: (1) willfully failed to pay support, as
described above; (2) failed to take steps to legally acknowledge the child,
claim paternity, or exercise parental rights and duties, or; (3) waived the
right to notice of the hearing in writing or did not appear at a termina-
tion hearing after receiving proper notice. 6
61. Id. § 60.6(2) (Supp. 1986).
62. The child of a parent whose rights have been previously terminated under OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 1130 or under § 29.1 may be adopted without obtaining further consent from that parent.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 29.1 (Supp. 1986) establishes a proceeding in which an adoption agency to
which a child has been relinquished by the natural mother for adoption can petition the court to
terminate the rights of the father, on the basis of one of the grounds set forth in § 1130 or § 60.6.
63. In Oklahoma the term "child of a marriage," previously referred to as "legitimate," see
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1.1, 1.2 (1981), includes children born in wedlock, OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1
(1981). In addition, children born within ten months after the dissolution of a marriage are pre-
sumed to be children of the marriage, and children born before wedlock become children of the
marriage by the subsequent marriage of their parents. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 2 (1981). OKLA. STAT.
tit. 10, § 55 (1981) further provides that:
The father of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as
such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it
as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. The status thus created is
that of a child adopted by regular procedure of court.
Id.
64. See supra note 63. In Oklahoma, a child previously referred to as "illegitimate" is now
referred to as a "child born out of wedlock." OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1.1 (1981).
65. Id. § 60.6 (Supp. 1987).
66. Id. Section 60.6 specifically provides:
A child under eighteen (18) years of age cannot be adopted without the consent of its
parents, if living, except that consent is not required from:
3. The father or putative father of a child born out of wedlock if:
a. prior to the hearing provided for in Section 29.1 of this title, and having
actual knowledge of the birth or impending birth of the child believed to be his
child, he fails to acknowledge paternity of the child or to take any action to
18
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Just as parents may consent to termination in actions under Title 10,
section 1130, parents may also voluntarily consent to termination of their
parental rights through adoption, including a stepparent adoption.67
Termination of parental rights in adoption may involve some of the
same pitfalls examined in this article in the context of parent-initiated
termination proceedings. Stepparent adoptions 68  and consents given
under duress of contempt or criminal charges both provide opportunity
for terminations motivated by the emotional or financial needs of one or
both parents rather than the needs of the child. 9 The primary ground
legally establish his claim to paternity of the child or to exercise parental rights or
duties over the child, including failure to contribute to the support of the mother
of the child to the extent of his financial ability during her term of pregnancy, or
b. at the hearing provided for in Section 29.1 of this title:
(1) he fails to prove that he is the father of the child, or
(2) having established paternity, he fails to prove that he has exercised
parental rights and duties toward the child unless he proves that prior to the
receipt of notice he had been specifically denied knowledge of the child or de-
nied the opportunity to exercise parental rights and duties toward the child.
As used in this subparagraph, specific denial of knowledge of the child or de-
nial of the opportunity to exercise parental rights and duties toward the child
shall not include those instances where the father or putative father fails to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he made a sufficient attempt to dis-
cover if he had fathered the child or to exercise parental rights and duties
toward the child prior to the receipt of notice, or
c. he waives in writing his right to notice of the hearing provided for in
Section 29.1 of this title, or
d. he fails to appear at the hearing provided for in Section 29.1 of this title
if all notice requirements continued in or pursuant to Section 1131 of this title
have been met.
A determination that the consent of the father or putative father of a child
born out of wedlock to the adoption of the child is not required shall not, by
itself, act to relieve such father or putative father of his obligation to provide for
the support of the child as otherwise required by law.
Id.
67. Id. § 60.5 (Supp. 1986). Section 60.5 sets forth procedures for parental consent to an adop-
tion of a child in writing, acknowledged before a judge. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 27, 28, 29, 30
(1981), also provide for a proceeding through which a natural parent may voluntarily relinquish her
parental rights in writing and acknowledged before the court, for purposes of adoption.
68. See supra note 5.
69. Two cases illustrate such parental motivations. In William K. v. Rebecca K. (In re Adop-
tion of A.G.K.), 728 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986), the appellate court concluded that the father
and stepmother devised a scheme to discourage the natural mother from paying child support in
order to terminate the mother's parental rights so the stepmother could adopt the child. In In re
Adoption of Gregory, 495 P.2d 1275, 1275-76 (Okla. 1972), the evidence showed the natural mother
and her husband had steadfastly refused several offers of child support payments and returned pay-
ments so that they could file for stepparent adoption without the father's consent. In both cases, the
courts refused to permit adoption without consent on the ground that the nonpayment was not
willful.
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for involuntary consent in adoptions-willful failure to support-simi-
larly creates the risk that the termination will be viewed as a child-sup-
port sanction without due consideration for the child's best interests.70
Even in adoption proceedings, termination solely on the basis of willful
failure to support may in many instances fail to satisfy the high standards
constitutionally required to terminate parental rights.7 1 Nevertheless,
the legislative goal for adoption proceedings is clearly to provide a child
with a strong parental relationship and not simply to dissolve a parental
relationship. Because the parent whose rights have been terminated in
adoption proceedings will be replaced by an adoptive parent who will
assume parental responsibilities, the potential adverse impact upon the
child, although still present, may be reduced. For that reason, termina-
tion of parental rights in adoption proceedings must be evaluated sepa-
rately and is not the focus of this article.
III. PARENT-INITIATED TERMINATION: BOTH UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND CONTRARY TO TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
A. Parent-Initiated Termination-Neither Essential nor Successful in
Achieving the Only Permissible Justification for
Termination
The only defensible justification for any termination of parental
rights is that this drastic measure is essential to protect a child from
harm and to promote the child's welfare, and that under the circum-
stances, these goals cannot be accomplished by less restrictive alterna-
tives. This conclusion is compelled by constitutional doctrine which
recognizes a fundamental right of parents to participate in the upbringing
70. See infra notes 214-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of this problem in the con-
text of parent-initiated proceedings.
71. See infra notes 87-101 for a discussion of the standards for deprivation of a fundamental
liberty interest compelled by substantive due process.
The suggestion that termination of parental rights in adoption proceedings on the sole basis of
willful failure to support does not satisfy constitutional standards is discussed in Comment, Termi-
nation of Parental Right" Should Nonpayment of Child Support Be Enough?, 67 IoWA L. Ray. 827
(1982). The author concludes that using termination to force compliance with state child support
laws was not the least restrictive alternative available to accomplish this objective and thus constitu-
tionally infirm.
An additional argument may be made that in cases where the child's financial needs are being
fully met by another parent or a third party, termination for nonsupport, even in adoption proceed-
ings, does not satisfy the only compelling state interest properly justifying termination-protection
of the child from harm. See infra notes 147 to 149 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
problem in the context of parent-initiated proceedings.
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of their children,72 and which should be extended to recognize a recipro-
cal right of the child to preservation of that fundamental relationship.73
It is further supported by a basic tenet of domestic law that in both pri-
vate disputes regarding custody, and in juvenile proceedings, the court
must act to promote the child's best interests.74
Parent-initiated termination proceedings under Oklahoma's current
statutory scheme violate the constitutional rights of both the parent and
child whose relationship is severed. The circumstances under which
these proceedings are initiated, and the permissible statutory grounds for
bringing them, indicate that termination is not necessary to protect the
child from harm. Legitimate concerns intended to be addressed by the
Oklahoma legislature can in fact be met by less restrictive alternatives.7"
Moreover, both constitutional and traditional family law doctrine are
further contravened because parent-initiated terminations are, in most
cases, actually detrimental to the interests of the child.76
1. Constitutional Protection Afforded the Fundamental
Rights of Parents
The United States Supreme Court has recognized on numerous oc-
casions that parents have a fundamental right under the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution to an ongoing relationship
with their children.77 In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, a case
involving termination of parental rights in juvenile proceedings, the
Court acknowledged that "[t]his Court's decisions have by now made
plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and
right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference
72. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 137-70 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 174-213 and accompanying text.
77. ERg., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1983) ("ITihe relationship of love and duty
in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection."); Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)
reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recog-
nized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally pro-
tected."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The rights to conceive and to raise one's
children have been deemed 'essential'....").
19891
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and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.' ,7 In a sub-
sequent case examining procedures to terminate parental rights, Santosky
v. Kramer, the Court declared:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, cus-
tody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply be-
cause they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are
strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable
destruction of their family life.7 9
This interest has been described by the Court as "far more precious than
any property right." 80 The purpose of a parental rights termination pro-
ceeding, the Court warned, is "not merely to infringe that fundamental
liberty interest, but to end it."81
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in the context of reviewing numer-
ous parental rights termination cases, has also repeatedly recognized the
fundamental nature of a parent's right to a relationship with a child, de-
rived from both the United States Constitution and the Oklahoma
Constitution.82
The doctrine of substantive due process83 guarantees that govern-
ment actions 84 that impair rights deemed fundamental will be strictly
78. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
79. 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). In Santosky the Court held the grounds for termination must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 769. See infra notes 277-91 for a more detailed
discussion of this case.
80. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)). Accord Rivera v. Minnich, 107 S. Ct. 3001, 3005 (1987).
81. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
82. E.g., R.E. v. State (In re A.E.), 743 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Okla. 1987); In re J.N.M.,655 P.2d
1032, 1035 (Okla. 1982); Coleman S. v. Department of Insts. Social and Rehab. Servs. (In re Sherol
A.S.), 581 P.2d 884, 888 (Okla. 1978).
83. The guarantee that neither the federal nor state governments may deprive a person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, found in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution, has been construed as the source of authority for judicial review of the
substance of legislation enacted by Congress or the state legislatures. Under the doctrine of substan-
tive due process, legislation which is found to impair rights regarded by the court as fundamental are
strictly scrutinized by the court and will be found invalid unless the legislation is necessary to pro-
mote a compelling state interest. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
350-51 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter J. NOWAK]. Those rights which have been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court as fundamental and deserving of strict scrutiny in the modern (post-
1937) era are extremely limited, and have been described as rights regarded by the Court as "essen-
tial to individual liberty in our society." J. NOWAK, Id. at 367.
84. The protection afforded individual rights and liberties by the fourteenth amendment, and
indeed by most of the United States Constitution and its amendments, shields individuals only from
governmental action, frequently referred to as "state action." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1688 (2d ed. 1988); J. NOWAK, supra note 83, at 421. Although parent-initiated
termination proceedings brought pursuant to § 1130(D) are initiated by private parties rather than
the state, the fact that this practice is authorized by Oklahoma statute provides the requisite state
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scrutinized by the court.85 Under this vigorous standard of review, the
governmental action will not be upheld unless it is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.86 Thus, Oklahoma law, which allows a parent's
fundamental right to a relationship with his or her child to be completely
extinguished, can survive constitutional challenge only when termination
of parental rights is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
a. A Compelling State Interest
What compelling state interest can justify termination of parental
rights? The Oklahoma Supreme Court has insisted that there is only one
answer to this question: protection of the child from harm.87 The court
action. The enactment of a statute, which is challenged as impairing a fundamental right or estab-
lishing a constitutionally invalid classification, is clearly state action. L. TRIBE, supra at 1688.
Moreover, termination of parental rights is certainly a "public function," i.e., an activity performed
almost exclusively by the government. If private parties "assume the role of the state by engaging in
these governmental functions then they subject themselves to the same limitations on their freedom
of action as would be imposed upon the state itself." J. NOWAK, supra note 83, at 426. Only the
state, through its legislature and judiciary, can terminate the legal status of parenthood. Therefore,
legislative authorization to private parties to initiate such proceedings in state courts on grounds
regulated by the state legislature does not relieve the state of meeting the high standards required by
substantive due process and equal protection when terminating parental rights in a parent-initiated
proceeding.
This conclusion is reinforced by a line of United States Supreme Court decisions considering the
constitutionality of various procedures used to allow termination in adoption proceedings brought
without the consent of the natural parent whose rights are to be to be terminated. In addressing the
rights of fathers of children born out of wedlock, the court acknowledged the fundamental nature of
parental rights, regardless of the fact that these actions were initiated by private parties. Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260-61 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978). In both
cases the Court found that the fathers were not entitled to a higher standard of constitutional protec-
tion because they had never had a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the
child. The Court recognized, however, that had the unwed fathers participated at some point in the
care of the child, their parental rights, like those of fathers of children born in wedlock, would be
afforded substantial protection under the due process clause. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261; Quilloin,
434 U.S. at 255-56.
85. J. NOWAK, supra note 83, at 357, 367, 370, 530-31, 693.
86. J. NOWAK, supra note 83, at 530.
87. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1109 (Okla. 1985) superseded by statute as stated in L.R.R.
v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988) ("The integrity of the family unit and preserva-
tion of the parent-child relationship command the highest protection in our society. Intrusion upon
the privacy and sanctity of that bond can be justified only upon demonstration of a compelling state
concern. Public interest lies in protecting the child from harm. Absent the element of harm, inter-
vention by the state is impermissible." (footnotes omitted)); In re J.N.M., 655 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Okla.
1982); Williams v. Mashburn (In re Baby Girl Williams), 602 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Okla. 1979); Cole-
man S. v. Department of Insts. Social and Rehab. Servs. (In re Sherol A.S.), 581 P.2d 884, 888
(Okla. 1978). It was in Sherol, that the Oklahoma Supreme Court first pronounced this interest:
The purpose of termination is to protect children from HARM suffered by reason of either
neglect or the intentional actions of their parents. Termination is not a means by which the
State of Oklahoma, through its juvenile courts and the Department, can exact conformity
from its citizen-parents through the imposition of an "acceptable" common value system
and "lifestyle." There is no authority in our Juvenile Code which allows the State to inter-
fere with family relationships where harm to children is not involved. This is, of course, a
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determined that this is a "notion of constitutional dimension," declaring
that "[t]he fundamental integrity of the family unit... is subject to intru-
sion and dismemberment by the State only where a 'compelling' State
interest arises and protecting the child from harm is the requisite State
interest."88
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has observed in dicta
that the due process clause would undoubtedly be offended if "a State
were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objec-
tions of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's
best interest."89 A principal concern with using "best interests of the
child" as a sole basis for termination is that cultural bias or judicial pref-
erence for certain lifestyles will promote termination of the rights of par-
ents in poor, minority, or nontraditional families even though the child is
not endangered or harmed by the parent's conduct.9" Thus, a finding
notion of constitutional dimension. The fundamental integrity of the family unit, which
has found protection in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Ninth Amendment, is subject to intrusion and dismemberment by the
State only where a "compelling" State interest arises and protecting the child from harm is
the requisite State interest.
Id. at 888. (footnotes omitted).
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part upon several lower federal court cases which
had endorsed the same standard: Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 23 (S.D. Iowa 1975)
("Rio sustain its compelling interest burden, the state must show that the consequences, in harm to
the children, of allowing the parent-child relationship to continue are more severe than the conse-
quences of termination."), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); Roe v. Conn., 417 F. Supp. 769, 779
(M.D. Ala. 1976). See Sims v. State Dep't of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1190-91 (S.D. Tex.
1977), rev'd, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court's reference to the Juvenile Code in Sherol is to a por-
tion of § 1130 that has subsequently been revised, the court's reiteration of this standard in Davis
subsequent to amendment of § 1130, its recognition that the requirement of protection from harm
was a "notion of constitutional dimension," and its citation to lower federal court cases which find
that termination of parental rights require a showing of harm to the child, all support the conclusion
that in Oklahoma protection of the child from harm remains the only constitutionally sufficient
interest justifying termination of parental rights.
88. Sherol, 581 P.2d at 888. See note 87 for the full text of this quotation.
89. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978), quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). In 1982, the United States Supreme
Court in a footnote in Santosky v. Kramer again observed: "Nor is it clear that the State constitu-
tionally could terminate a parent's right without showing parental unfitness." 455 U.S. 745, 760 n. 10
(1982).
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether a finding that existing or
threatened harm to the child is the only compelling state interest justifying termination of parental
rights which will satisfy the requirements of substantive due process. This issue was directly raised
in Doe v. Delaware, which was dismissed by the Court, after noting probable jurisdiction for want of
a properly presented federal question. 450 U.S. 382, 383 (1981). See Parker, supra note 21, at 563.
90. See Sherol, 581 P.2d 884, 888, 890-91 (1978) ("Termination is not a means by which the
State ... can exact conformity from its citizen-parents through the imposition of an 'acceptable'
common value system and 'lifestyles.' ") (See supra note 87 for full text of this quotation); In re J. P.,
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that termination is in the child's best interests, while certainly crucial to
any termination, is not by itself a sufficient ground in Oklahoma to termi-
nate parental rights.91 A finding that termination is necessary to protect
the child from harm is essential.
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court's pronouncement of the
"protection from harm" standard was made in the context of termination
648 P.2d 1364, 1376 (Utah 1982) ("To allow a court to decide who can best provide a child intellec-
tual stimulation could chill the propagation and perpetuation of disfavored political, philosophical,
and religious views within the privacy of the family circle. Unlike the standard of 'parental fitness,'
which imposes a high burden on the state in an adversary proceeding, the standard of 'best interest'
of the child provides an open invitation to trample on individual rights through trendy redefinitions
and administrative or judicial abuse.") See generally Dasovick v. A.B. (In re R.D.S.), 259 N.W. 2d
636, 638 (N.D. 1977) ("Evidence which compares the child-rearing skills of the mother and of the
foster parents cannot alone form the basis of a finding of harm to the child, provided the mother's
efforts meet minimum standards of care."); cf, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763, (1982)
("Because parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of
minority groups .... such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class
bias."); Wald, supra note 56, at 651.
For a good illustration of this problem, see Petition of New England Home for Little Wander-
ers, 367 Mass. 631, 328 N.E. 2d 854 (1975).
91. There is substantial disagreement among the various states as to whether the "best interests
of the child" alone is a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights. Many courts have held it is
not sufficient. See In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 67-68, 688 P.2d 918, 919-20, 207 Cal. Rptr.
309, 310-11 (1984) (In adoption proceedings, the court found, based on statutory interpretation, that
natural father's parental rights could not be terminated by considering only the best interests of
child, without first considering whether an award of custody to him would be detrimental to the
child.); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 120 Ariz. 82, 584 P.2d 63, 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)
(statute authorizing termination of parental rights does not authorize termination merely because
termination may be "in the best interest of the child."); In re R.D.S., 259 N.W.2d 636, 638 (N.D.
1977) (Based upon North Dakota's statutes, the court found "best interest of the child" was not the
primary question in a termination proceeding and a finding that the child has or will suffer serious
harm is required. A showing of parental misconduct without a showing of resultant harm to the
child was not sufficient); In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1233 (Pa. 1978) (Child cannot be re-
moved from home absent showing child has been "subjected to abuse or suffered serious harm, or
that threat of such harm is real and substantial and cannot be alleviated by... less drastic" means.);
Contra, eg., Washington County Dep't of Social Services v. Clark, 296 Md. 190, 461 A.2d 1077
(Md. 1983); Adoption of a Minor, 378 Mass. 793, 389 N.E.2d 90 (1979) (stepparent adoption). One
commentator suggests that even in these cases of termination based solely on the ground that it
serves the child's best interests, "evidence of serious parental neglect or harm is usually found." H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 893-94, n.6 (2d ed. 1988).
Some courts have found termination on the "best interest" ground alone to violate substantive
due process. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982) (substantive due process requires proof
of unfitness); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 604 (D. C. Cir. 1983); Roe v. Conn., 417 F.
Supp. 769, 779 (M. D. Ala. 1976); In re R.W., 495 So.2d 133, 135 (Fla. 1986) (State must show
abandonment, abuse or neglect to permanently terminate parental rights.); In re Brooks, 228 Kan.
541, 618 P.2d 814, 820-22 (1980). However, other courts have upheld the constitutionality of using
a "best interest" standard to terminate. E.g., In re JS.R., 374 A.2d 860, 862-63 (D.C. 1977); Peti-
tion of New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 328 N.E.2d 854, 859 (1975) (How-
ever, court found best interest test incorporates elements of unfitness, and termination without
unfitness permissible only if long separation and attachment to adoptive parent would cause harm to
child if returned to parent).
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proceedings initiated by the state, there is no reason why the same com-
pelling state interest should not be required to terminate parental rights
in parent-initiated proceedings brought under the same statute. The ra-
tionale behind imposition of this rigorous standard is to provide the ut-
most protection to the intrinsic human right to a relationship with one's
child. This right is no less fundamental because it is threatened in a pro-
ceeding initiated by a private party rather than by the state. Ultimately,
only the state has the power to strip a parent of the legal rights and
responsibilities associated with parenthood, and the fact that it chooses
to allow a private party to initiate the proceeding does not diminish the
state's responsibility to exercise its power only when justified by the same
compelling state interest: the need to protect a child from harm.
Moreover, the same high standard must be imposed regardless of
whether the parent threatened with termination is a custodial parent or a
noncustodial parent. Parents threatened with termination of their paren-
tal rights in juvenile proceedings have frequently been denied physical
and legal custody of their child for lengthy periods prior to initiation of
termination proceedings. However, this factor has not affected the
courts' willingness to afford them the highest constitutional protection. 92
Similarly, where legal custody of a child is with another parent rather
than the state at the onset of termination proceedings, judicial opinion
has acknowledged the fundamental nature of the noncustodial parent's
right to a continuing relationship with his or her child. The noncustodial
parent's relationship has been afforded the same formidable constitu-
tional protection93 in those instances where the parent has had a signifi-
cant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child at one
92. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the state of New York had legal and physical
custody of one child for approximately five years and of the other child approximately four years
before petitioning to terminate the parent's rights in a juvenile proceeding. Nevertheless, the Court
observed "[tihe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to the State." Id. at 753. Accordingly, the Court afforded signifi-
cant weight to the parents' interest in its procedural due process analysis. See also, e.g., In re
J.N.M., 655 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Okla. 1982) (Juvenile proceeding in which termination hearing was
held approximately two years after the state took temporary physical and legal custody of children,
but court acknowledged fundamental nature of parents' rights and held substantive due process
forbids termination absent showing of actual or imminent harm to a child.); Williams v. Mashburn
(In re Baby Girl Williams), 602 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Okla. 1979) (Child placed in legal and physical
custody of relatives seven days after birth and was never in mother's custody prior to termination
proceedings initiated 10 1/2 months later, yet court held due process required a showing that termi-
nation was necessary to protect child from harm.)
93. An Oklahoma appellate court, in Blevins v. Thomas (In re Adoption of Blevins), 695 P.2d
556 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984), specifically acknowledged that the noncustodial father, threatened with
termination of his parental rights in a stepparent adoption proceeding, was entitled to "the full
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time.94 Thus, termination of the rights of both noncustodial and custo-
dial parents in parent-initiated proceedings in Oklahoma cannot be con-
stitutionally accomplished without proof that such termination is
necessary to achieve the compelling state interest of protecting the child
from harm.
panoply of procedural and substantive safeguards associated with constitutional protections of fun-
damental rights." Id. at 560. Cf. O.K.H. v. J.L.H. (In re Adoption of J.L.H.), 737 P.2d 915, 920
(Okla. 1987) (Stepparent adoption denied for failure to meet clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard); William K. v. Rebecca K. (In re Adoption of A.G.K.), 728 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986)
(In stepparent adoption case, court held both noncustodial parent and child must be accorded funda-
mentally fair procedures.).
Courts from other states have similarly recognized the fundamental nature of the rights of a
noncustodial parent threatened with termination. See, ag., In re Adoption of McMullen, 691 P.2d
17, 21 (Kan. 1984); In re Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. 1977). Cf In re Baby Girl
M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 73-5, 688 P.2d 918, 924-25, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309, 314-16 (1984). A scholarly and
thorough discussion of the issue can be found in Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 594-602 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). Following an extensive discussion of applicable case law and analysis of the considera-
tions underlying the considerable constitutional protection afforded parent-child relationships, the
court concluded that the constitutional interests of a noncustodial father, whose rights to contact
with his children were effectively cut off by a federal witness protection program, were "roughly
comparable to the interests of a parent and child in a viable nuclear family." Id. at 602. Thus the
court afforded the noncustodial father the same degree of constitutional protection guaranteed a
custodial parent faced with termination of parental rights. Central to the court's decision was the
recognition that both parent and child depend heavily on "ties with the other for his sense of self-
worth." Id. at 599. The court observed "that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life
is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his offspring." Id. at
599. The court also observed "that the emotional stability of children of divorced parents is often
tied to the quality of their continuing relationships with their non-custodial parent." Id. at 601
(citations omitted).
Further support is implied in two United States Supreme Court opinions. In Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, rehg denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978), in a unanimous opinion by Justice Mar-
shall, the Court clearly suggested, in dicta, that a married parent who was separated or divorced and
no longer living with his child would be entitled to the same constitutional protection as a married
parent with whom a child resides. The Court observed that "even a father whose marriage has
broken apart will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of
the marriage." Id. at 256. Subsequently, in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) the Court
observed that a parent's fundamental liberty interest is not foreclosed by a loss of temporary custody
(four to five years in Santosky). Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (the rights of a
noncustodial father of a child born out of wedlock with whom he had previously lived and supported
were protected under the equal protection clause, because the state law was found to discriminate
between unwed mothers and fathers by allowing adoption without the consent of unwed fathers).
94. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-65 (1983), the United States Supreme Court re-
fused to afford an unwed father, who had never had any significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship with his child, the same constitutional protection guaranteed to a parent who had had
such a relationship, such as the father in Caban, 441 U.S. at 380. The Court allowed the father's
rights to be terminated in a stepparent adoption proceeding without notice, because he had not
followed the statutory scheme to register his intent to claim paternity or otherwise protect his rights.
Similarly, in Quilloin, the Court upheld adoption of a child without the father's consent or any
showing of his unfitness, suggesting that he was not entitled to full constitutional protection because
he had never lived with the child nor had he petitioned to legitimate the child in the 11 years prior to
the adoption proceedings. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56.
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b. Necessity and the Least Restrictive Alternative
Even though the interests of a state are sufficiently compelling, if the
means chosen by the government for achieving these interests unnecessa-
rily impair a fundamental right, the governmental action will not with-
stand strict scrutiny by the court.95 The requirement of "necessity"
dictates that when a statute significantly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right in order to serve compelling governmental objectives,
it must be "closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.",96 The stat-
ute is not sufficiently tailored to the governmental purpose if it is grossly
overinclusive or underinclusive.97 The requirement of "necessity" fur-
ther demands that if a state can achieve its goal by a less restrictive alter-
native, impairment of a fundamental right will not be upheld.98
According to the United States Supreme Court, "if there are other, rea-
sonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitution-
ally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater
interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' "99 This
principle has been used by the United States Supreme Court to strike
down statutes restricting fundamental familial rights," and has been ac-
knowledged by lower federal and state courts as a vital component of the
constitutional protection afforded individuals threatened with termina-
tion of their parental rights."' 1 Accordingly, termination of parental
95. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). See J. NOWAK, supra note 83, at 530.
96. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. Accord, eg., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
97. In Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 390-91, one governmental objective, protection of the ability of
marriage applicants to pay child support, was held to be an insufficient justification for statutory
restrictions on the fundamental right to marry. The statute was found both grossly underinclusive,
by failing to limit other new financial commitments, and substantially overinclusive, by preventing
marriage of individuals who might be better able to pay child support if they remarried.
98. E.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959
(1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). See Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374, 389-91 (1978).
99. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
100. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-91 (1978) (Court held a state statute restricting the right to marry
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because it failed to serve some of state's professed
objectives, and another objective could be achieved by less restrictive alternatives). Cf. Doe v. Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 179, 194-95, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
101. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Government witness protection
program could not effectively terminate father's parental rights, at request of mother, where govern-
ment could arrange contacts of children with father that would not jeopardize the safety of children,
mother, or witness. Father, in this case, was not the person from whom the program was providing
protection; protection was necessitated by a stepparent's connections with organized crime.); Roe v.
Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (The state's interest, however, would be "compelling
enough to sever entirely the parent-child relationship only when the child is subjected to real physi-
cal or emotional harm and less drastic measures would be unavailing."); In re Brooks, 618 P.2d 814,
822 (Kan. 1980) ("The drastic remedy of termination of parental rights should not be utilized unless
the court is satisfied there is no realistic alternative and so finds."); In re Adoption of Blevins, 695
[Vol. 24:299
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rights in parent-initiated proceedings is constitutionally valid only if: 1)
protection of the child from harm-the compelling state interest-is in
fact served by termination of one parent's rights, 2) the statute is not
impermissibly overinclusive or underinclusive, and 3) protection of the
child from harm cannot be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.
2. A Child's Fundamental Right to Preservation of the Parent-
Child Relationship when Child's Welfare Would be
Promoted
Familial relationships are reciprocal. Since the courts have irrefuta-
bly affirmed a parent's ability to enjoy an ongoing relationship with his or
her child as an intrinsic human right,"02 no less recognition should be
given to the fundamental nature of a child's interest in the preservation
of a relationship with the child's parent. 10 3 For a child, the maintenance
P.2d 556, 560 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985); In re William, 383 A.2d 1228, 1233 (Pa. 1978), cert denied,
439 U.S 880 (1978). See In re J.N.M., 655 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Okla. 1982). But cf In re R.J.M., 266
S.E.2d 114, 117-118 (v. Va. 1980) (Court acknowledged by implication constitutional and statutory
requirement that termination not be exercised if less restrictive alternative is available, but court's
approval of termination in that case raises questions as to its adherence to the principle.).
102. E.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977). See supra notes
77-81 and accompanying text.
103. The fundamental nature of the child's interest in retaining the parental bond has received
some recognition from the courts. Although the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly
pronounced a fundamental right on the part of a child to continue a relationship with a natural
parent, the Court has observed that the consequences of termination are far-reaching for the child
and that, "until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in
preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
760 & n.ll, 765 (1982). See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 270 (1983) (White, Marshall, Black-
mun, J.J., dissenting) ("If 'both the child and the [putative father] in a paternity action have a
compelling interest,' [citation to Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981)] it cannot be disputed that
both the child and the putative father have a compelling interest in the outcome of a proceeding that
may result in the termination of the father-child relationship.").
One Oklahoma appellate court has specifically held that a child has a fundamental liberty inter-
est in the continution of the parent-child relationship. The court in Wiliam K. v. Rebecca K. (In re
Adoption of A.G.K.), 728 P.2d 1 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986), held in a stepparent adoption action that:
[TMo the extent the statute authorizes abrogation of a substantial parental right affecting
the child-particularly where the annulment has the ultimate effect of a complete termina-
tion as here-without consideration of or regard for the child's fundamental liberty interest
in its continuation, the statute is constitutionally infirm. It offends the child's state and
federal constitutional due process rights--both procedural and substantive [citation to U.S.
Constitution amend. V, IX, and XIV, § 1; Okla. Constitution art. 2, § 7]-and deprives her
of other rights guaranteed by the fifth, fourteenth and ninth amendments, including equal
protection of the laws (citation omitted).
Id. See infra note 114 for more extensive discussion of this case.
In two lower federal court cases in which the children were named parties, the courts gave some
implied recognition to the fundamental nature of the children's interests as well as those of their
parents threatened with termination. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 599-602 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Following lengthy consideration of the impact of separation on the emotional wellbeing of the chil-
dren as well as the parent, the court held: "In light of these considerations, we conclude that the
constitutional interests asserted by the plaintiffs [father and children, by father as next friend] are, in
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of ties to his or her parent is no less vital to emotional well being' °4 than
continuity of the bond is for the parent. Termination of parental rights,
by abrogating the parent's legal right to visitation, 0 5 normally forecloses
the child's opportunity to visit or communicate with the parent until the
child reaches the age of majority. The child is further deprived of the
right to financial support from the parent whose rights have been termi-
nated.106 The effect of termination in many states is to strip the child of
all legal rights emanating from the parent-child relationship. 107 In
Oklahoma, only the right of the child to inherit from the natural parent
is preserved.108 Thus, the child, as well as the parent, has fundamental
rights derived from the parent-child relationship that deserve heightened
constitutional protection.10 9
One cannot argue, however, that because the child also has funda-
mental interests that emanate from the parental bond, it promotes the
child's welfare to preserve the relationship in all circumstances. Clearly
critical respects, roughly comparable to the interest of a parent and child in a viable nuclear family."
Id. at 602. The court then proceeded to apply strict scrutiny to the effective termination created by a
government witness program.); Roe v. Conn., 417 F. Supp. 769, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("ITihe Con-
stitution recognizes as fundamental the right of family integrity. This means that . . . the State's
severance of Plaintiff Wambles' [mother's] parent-child relationship and of Plaintiff Roe's (child's]
child-parent relationship will receive strict judicial scrutiny.")
Some support for the constitutional dimension of children's rights in the context of relationships
with their parents has also been suggested by commentators. See Parker, supra note 21, at 572-74;
cf. Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423, 446-47 (1976-
77) (Roth suggests a child's rights in a custody dispute are entitled to constitutional protection).
104. See infra notes 177 to 209 and accompanying text. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in Franz v. United States, 707 F. 2d 582, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1983), recognized the "profound
importance of the bond between a parent and child to the emotional life of both. [citation omitted]"
The court observed:
Frequently each party to the relationship depends heavily on his ties with the other for his
sense of self-worth, for his very self-definition. To rephrase the point in the language of
entitlements, a parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives
from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend
significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his offspring. A child's corre-
sponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from the psychic
importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsive, reliable adult.
Id. (citations omitted).
105. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1132 (1981). See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
107. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-80 (Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 16-2011 (1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-46 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-148 (1984).
108. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1132 (1981). Several states take a similar approach. See, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-611(1) (1987); WYo. STAT.§ 14-2-317 (1986).
109. It has been well-established that children, as well as adults, "are protected by the Constitu-
tion and possess constitutional rights." Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977)
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)). Accord
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979).
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there are some instances in which termination of parental rights is neces-
sary to protect a child from harm,"' less restrictive alternatives cannot
provide adequate protection,11' and the harm caused by the termination
is less severe than the harm caused by continuing the relationship." 2 It
makes little sense to argue that the child's constitutional rights require
enhanced protection for preservation of the parent-child relationship in
these situations.' 13 Rather, the courts should recognize that a child has a
fundamental right to preservation of a parent-child relationship when
continuing the relationship promotes the child's welfare. In essence,
recognition of this right infuses into the constitutional analysis the addi-
tional requirement that a court cannot terminate a parent-child relation-
ship unless the termination is found to be in the best interests of the
child.' 14
"Constitutionalizing" this requirement as an additional element of
the judicial analysis for termination should not create conflict between
the rights of the child and the constitutional rights of a parent threatened
with termination,"' nor should it foster the additional risks of cultural
110. Protection of a child from harm, of course, is the interest recognized by Oklahoma courts as
substantially compelling to satisfy the requirements of substantive due process in regard to termina-
tion of parental rights. See supra notes 87-88.
111. See supra notes 98-101.
112. In describing the compelling state interest required by substantive due process to terminate
parental rights, the court in Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), held "that
terminations must only occur where more harm is likely to befall the child by staying with his
parents than by being permanently separated from them." Id. at 24. See also Parker, supra note 21,
at 574-80.
113. By way of illustration, an easy example of such a situation might be if a very young child
has been repeatedly and severely physically abused by the parents, even after counseling and a tem-
porary removal of the child from the home; the child has been in foster care with a family hoping to
adopt her and has formed deep emotional ties to the prospective adoptive family; and expert psycho-
logical evaluation has confirmed that the child has significant fear of the natural parents and is
emotionally and psychologically bonded to the prospective adoptive family rather than the natural
parents.
114. One Oklahoma appellate court has already explicitly recognized such a finding is required
by both the Federal Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution. In William K. v. Rebecca K. (In
re Adoption A.G.K.), 728 P.2d 1 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986), a stepparent adoption appeal brought by a
natural mother whose child was found eligible for adoption without her consent, the court held:
"When the state authorizes destruction of familial bonds it must provide both parent and child with
fundamentally fair procedures which, among other things, require that petitioners allege and prove
by at least clear and convincing evidence that the extinguishment of the natural parent-child rela-
tionship is in the best interest of the child." Id. at 7. The appellate court found that the failure of
the trial judge "to concern himself with the child's interests in having her natural parental bonds
preserved" violated the child's rights as guaranteed by the fifth, fourteenth, and ninth amendments
of the United States Constitution and Oklahoma Constitution, art. 2, § 7. Id. See also Alsager v.
District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 24 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Parker, supra note 21 at 574-80; Wald, supra
note 56 at 690-91.
115. Courts have perhaps been hesitant to focus on the constitutional interests of the child in
termination proceedings because of the problems with defining the constitutional rights of the child.
1989]
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bias anticipated from use of the "best interests" standard as the sole crite-
ria for termination." 6 This is because termination will continue to be
prohibited unless it is necessary to protect a child from harm, thus giving
due constitutional protection to the fundamental rights of the parent.
Moreover, imposition of the "protection from harm" standard is re-
garded by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as consistent with serving the
child's best interests.1 17  The imposition of an additional requirement
As noted above, the argument that the child has a constitutional right to the benefits of the parent-
child relationship makes sense only in situations where the child is benefited more than harmed by
the relationship. On the other hand, where the child's fundamental interest is more accurately de-
fined as the right to preservation of the relationship when continuing the relationship promotes the
child's welfare, there is the risk that this will be misconstrued as a constitutional right of the child to
have "the best interests of the child" be the sole criteria for termination. Such a construction would
be erroneous and should be avoided because it places no limitations on judicial discretion, creates
greater risks that cultural bias will occur, and fosters conflict between the recognition of constitu-
tional rights of both the parent and the child. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
For example, the conflict between parental rights and children's rights in the context of termi-
nation frequently occurs where one side argues termination is in the best interests of the child and
the other side contends termination is unjustified because the parent is not unfit, see, e.g., In re
Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977); Washington County Dept. of Soc. Serv. v.
Clark, 296 Md. 190, 461 A.2d 1077 (1983); In re New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367
Mass. 631, 328 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1975). The classic example is where a child would suffer serious
psychological harm from separation from prospective adoptive parents with whom the child has
lived for a lengthy period, even though the parent is not at the time of the termination hearing unfit.
See In re Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d at 860. If a child's constitutional right is to have the sole
criteria become what is in his or her best interests and if unfitness is the alternate standard required
to provide adequate protection to the parent, the court is faced with choosing between conflicting
rights. Using Oklahoma's present standard and including as an additional requirement that termina-
tion be in the child's best interest, however, avoids this conflict. Termination cannot be accom-
plished unless it is necessary to protect a child from harm and it is in the child's best interests.
Although detailed discussion of this is beyond the scope of this article, use of the protection
from harm standard favored by Oklahoma courts rather than the "unfitness" standard further
reduces the potential for conflict. By framing the compelling state interest in terms of protection of
the child from harm rather than protection from an unfit parent, the conflict presented in the above
hypothetical is more readily resolved. In most instances, the tests achieve the same result because
"unfitness" incorporates the concept that the parent would be harmful. In rare instances, however,
the parent may not be unfit but returning custody to the parent could cause extreme psychological
damage. If the court finds that the child would suffer permanent psychological damages from sepa-
ration from prospective adoptive parents and return to a natural parent whom the child has never
known, the court might constitutionally terminate on the basis that it was necessary to protect the
child from harm and promoted the child's welfare. For one example of consideration of serious
psychological harm as grounds for termination, see Sorentino v. Family and Children's Society of
Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18 (1977). Undue reliance on psychological harm, however, must
be avoided due to the risk that courts might expansively define protection from psychological harm
to promote their conception of a proper lifestyle. Such an interpretation would clearly be erroneous
and harmful. When harm is of a psychological nature, a most narrow interpretation must be applied
(i.e. permanent psychological damage which could not be overcome by counseling, gradual rein-
troduction to natural parent, or other alternative steps, and corroborated by expert psychological
testimony).
116. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
117. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1109 & n.33, (Okla. 1985) (dictum) superseded by statute as
stated in L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988). See In re T.H.L., 636 P.2d 330,
332 (Okla. 1981); In re C. G., 637 P.2d 66, 71 (Okla. 1981); Sweet v. Johnson (In re Sweet), 317 P.2d
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that the court specifically find termination to be in the child's best inter-
ests insures that termination will not be allowed in cases where some risk
of harm can be shown if the parental relationship continues, but the det-
riment to the child would be greater if the parental bond is severed.
Requiring that termination of parental rights must be in the child's
best interests is hardly a novel idea, and as the following section indi-
cates, Oklahoma statutes118 and common law119 already enforce this re-
quirement. By elevating the requirement to one of constitutional
dimension, however, the fundamental nature of the benefits that the child
derives from the parent-child relationship are given the recognition and
heightened constitutional protection to which they are entitled.
3. Common Law and Statutory Prohibition of Termination if
Not in the Best Interests of the Child
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has frequently endorsed the concept
that in matters of custody and state intervention in family life, the courts
must promote the welfare of the child involved. The duty of the court to
act in the best interests of the child in disputes relating to a child's
custody has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American law, 120 well
231, 235 (Okla. 1957) ("Parents have by nature, as well as by law, the legal right to the custody of
their minor children . . . and, by reason of this, as well as the importance of the influence and
protection afforded by parental affection to the best interests of children, especially those of tender
years, in respect to their temporal, mental and moral welfare, (where such affection is manifest) it is
presumed, in the absence of a strong and clear showing to the contrary, that their best interests are
served by letting them remain with their parents.").
See also In re Brooks, 228 Kan. 541, 548, 618 P.2d 814, 821 (1980) ("[T]he welfare of children
is always a matter of paramount concern, but the policy of the state proceeds on the theory that their
welfare can best be attained by leaving them in the custody of their parents and seeing to it that the
parents' right thereto is not infringed upon or denied." (quoting In re Kailer, 123 Kan. 229, 230-31,
255 P. 41, 42 (1927)); cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982) ("Yet while there is still
reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, the parens patriae interest
favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds.").
118. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1987). See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
120. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 788 (2d ed.
1988). See Cochran, The Search for Guidance In Determining the Best Interests of the Child At
Divorce: Reconciling The Ptimary Caretaker and Joint Custody Preferences, 20 U. Ricm. L. REv. 1,
2 (1985); C. FooTE, R. LEVY, & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 855 (3d ed.
1985).
This duty to act in the best interest of the child should be distinguished from what has been
referred to as the "case-by-case best interests of the child" standard which is frequently used as the
"test" to award custody in initial custody proceedings between two parents. H. CLARK, supra, at
797-98; Cochran, supra, at 3. While that standard explicitly reflects the state's underlying duty,
other standards which have been employed, such as the "primary caretaker preference," were also
fashioned with the ultimate intention of promoting the child's welfare. H. CLARK, supra, at 798;
Cochran, supra, at 2 ("Many different rules have been established in the name of the interests of the
child.").
33
Blair: Parent-Initiated Termination of Parental Rights: The Ultimate Wea
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:299
recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in all types of custody ac-
tions.12' Similarly, the ability of states, through juvenile proceedings, to
intervene in familial relationships for the protection of the child is de-
rived from the doctrine of parens patriae, the concept that the sovereign
must protect and promote the welfare of those unable to protect them-
selves."22 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has clearly pronounced the
court's duty in proceedings initiated under the Juvenile Code: "[T]he
entire Juvenile Code must be viewed as creating public/state remedies to
be administered in the best interest of minors who fall within its contem-
plation." '123 Parent-initiated proceedings to terminate another parent's
rights are clearly a type of custody proceeding,124 since the effect of ter-
mination is to deprive one parent of all future right to custody or visita-
tion with the child, and such proceedings are instituted in Oklahoma
under the authority of the Juvenile Code. 25 Termination of parental
rights in parent-initiated proceedings under circumstances where termi-
nation fails to serve the child's best interests would thus contravene a
fundamental principle of family law well recognized by Oklahoma courts
121. Oklahoma courts have repeatedly reaffirmed their recognition that in custody proceedings)
the paramount consideration is the best interests of the child. E.g., Gorham v. Gorham, 692 P.2d
1375 (Okla. 1984); Rice v. Rice, 603 P.2d 1125 (Okla. 1979). This is true regardless of the type of
proceeding and standard or test that is applied. See, eg., Gorham, 692 P.2d at 1378-79 (initial
custody determination using "case-by-case best interests of child" test); Boatsman v. Boatsman, 697
P.2d 516, 518-19 (Okla. 1984) (modification action applying "change of circumstances" test, wherein
the court declared that "ultimately all child custody matters must be determined on the best interest
of the child" and held that "[t]he ability to modify the decree upon a showing of 'change of circum-
stances' offers adequate opportunity for the parties and the court to protect the interests of the
child."); Grover v. Phillips (In re Grover), 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984) (Custody dispute between
natural parent and third-party, for which test in Oklahoma is unfitness of parent, in which court
stated: "In recognizing and giving full effect to the tenured right of a natural parent to the custody
of his or her natural child, the overriding consideration is the best interest of the child.").
122. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Okla. 1985) superseded by statute as stated in
L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 337-39,
383 A.2d 1228, 1235-36 (Pa. 1978). See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Coleman,
Standards for Termination of Parental Rights, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 315, 321 (1980).
123. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1106. See also William K. v. Rebecca K. (In re Adoption of A.G.K.),
728 P.2d 1, 5 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (Court recognized that the protection of the best interests of the
child is the "primary purpose for and paramount objective of all children-oriented provisions of Title
10.").
124. Cf. Oa.A STAT. tit. 10, § 1604 (1981), the definitional section of the Oklahoma Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which defines "custody determination" as "a court decision and
court orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation rights..." and
defines "custody proceeding" as "proceedings in which a custody determination is one of several
issues, such as an action for divorce or separation, and includes child neglect or dependency
proceedings."
125. OKLA. STAT. tit., 10 § 1130(D) (Supp. 1987), the source of authority for parent-initiated
termination of parental rights proceedings, is part of Chapter 51 of Title 10, referred to by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court as the Juvenile Code. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1105.
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and frustrate the underlying rationale for the state's assertion of
authority.
It is also clear that the Oklahoma legislature's vision of the role of
the courts in custody matters and juvenile proceedings is to promote the
welfare of children. This is evidenced by numerous statutory mandates
that custody decisions 126 and various types of state intervention author-
ized by the Juvenile Code,127 including termination of parental rights,' 28
be evaluated in accordance with the best interests of the child.
Unfortunately, title 10, section 1130 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
which authorizes termination of parental rights, only requires a specific
finding that termination is in the child's best interests when termination
is based on certain grounds, and omits mention of a specific finding of
best interests for the grounds used in parent-initiated proceedings.' 29
One Oklahoma appellate court has recognized that the fact that the legis-
lature provided in the introductory paragraph of section 1130 that a
court "may" terminate parental rights upon the grounds recited therein,
indicates that the court is granted discretion to decline termination even
where a ground is satisfied if termination is contrary to the best interests
of the child.130 While that construction is undoubtedly correct and con-
sistent with the objectives of "all the children-oriented provisions of title
126. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1275.4 (Supp. 1983), which governs the award of custody in actions
for divorce or separate maintenance, provides: "In awarding the custody of a minor unmarried child
or in appointing a general guardian for said child, the court shall consider what appears to be in the
best interests of the physical and mental and moral welfare of the child." OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 21
(Supp. 1983), which governs custody actions initiated by parents who are separated, also requires
that the court award custody "in accordance with the best interests of the child." See also OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 21.1 (Supp. 1983). Section 21.1 requires custody be awarded to parents or third
parties in a certain order of preference, in accordance with the best interests of the child.
127. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1104.1(D) (Supp. 1984), which provides in part: "No order
of the court providing for the removal of an alleged or adjudicated deprived child from his home
shall be entered unless the court finds that the continuation of the child in his home is contrary to
the welfare of the child."; OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1114(A) (Supp. 1986), which provides: "If the
court finds that the allegations of the petition [alleging a child is delinquent, deprived, in need of
supervision or in need of treatment] are supported by the evidence, and that it is in the best interest
of the child and the public that he be made a ward of the court, the court shall sustain the petition,
and shall make an order of adjudication. ... ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1115(a) (1981), allowing
admission at the dispositional hearing of "all evidence helpful in determining the proper disposition
best serving the interest of the child and the public .. "
128. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1987) explicitly provides that termination of parental
rights in juvenile proceedings cannot be accomplished on the grounds of consent, deprivation with
failure to timely correct conditions leading to depreviation, incarceration, or mental illness without a
specific finding by the court that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.
129. Id.
130. William K. v. Rebecca K. (In re Adoption of A.G.K.), 728 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Okla. Ct. App.
1986) (emphasis added) (dictum).
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10, ' '131 the current language of section 1130 could be subject to
misinterpretation.
The risk that this oversight may mislead courts in parent-initiated
proceedings is not totally hypothetical. In Davis v. Davis,32 a parent-
initiated proceeding, the trial judge considering termination of a father's
rights for nonpayment of support stated that he interpreted the statute to
give him no choice but to terminate upon proof of willful failure to sup-
port for the preceding year. Although the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the trial judge was mistaken in his belief that section 1130
left him without any choice in the matter of termination, the language of
the statute clearly fosters such an error. 133 In a subsequent parent-initi-
ated termination proceeding, Griffith v. Giffith, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court similarly observed that the trial judge's termination order on the
grounds of nonsupport "was not based upon a finding by the court that
131. The appellate court in In re A.G.K., 728 P.2d at 4-5, based its interpretation in part upon
the fact that protection of the best interests of the child "is the primary purpose for and paramount
objective of all the children-oriented provisions of Title 10."
132. 708 P.2d 1102, 1105 n.7 (Okla. 1985). The Oklahoma Supreme Court observed from the
record that the trial judge stated when rendering his order:
The statute appears to be a rather harsh remedy, but I don't see anything that shouldn't be
followed. It's very clear that father or parent who fails to contribute to the support of the
child for a period of over one year, or during the preceeding year, has their [sic] rights
terminated. So, I don't see that the Court has any choice under the statute but to terminate
parental rights.
Id.
Although it was the 1981 version of § 1130 that the trial court was interpreting in Davis, the
relevant portion of the statute being interpreted, § 1130(A)(4), is identical to the version of § 1130,
as most recently amended in 1987, currently in force.
133. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1105.
The same error was committed by the trial judge in a step-parent adoption proceeding regarding
interpretation of tit. 10, § 60.6 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Section 60.6 sets forth as one ground for
adoption without consent of a natural parent the willful failure of the parent to contribute to the
child's support, in substantial compliance with a court order or according to the parents' financial
ability if no order exists. The trial judge in In re A.G.K., 728 P.2d 1 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986), was
interpreting the 1981 version of tit. 10, § 60.6, which is comparable to the current version, Okla.
Stat. tit. 10, § 60.6 (Supp. 1986), in that it allows adoption without consent for nonpayment of
support without specifying that the court must make a finding that adoption without the consent of
the natural parent is in the best interests of the child. The court of appeals observed that the trial
judge's pre-decisional remarks indicated that "he considered himself bound to conclude that the
mother's consent to adoption of her child was not necessary if he found her conduct satisfied one or
more of the grounds set out in § 60.6." In re A.G.K., 728 P.2d at 4. The appellate court sympa-
thized with the judge's error by implying that the statute was misleading, but found that the statute
must be construed to vest in the trial court the inherent discretion to allow or deny adoption without
the consent of the natural parent, depending upon what the best interests of the child require. Id. at
5. The appellate court found that consideration of the child's interests was constitutionally com-
pelled to protect the child's fundamental rights. Id. at 7. It is also consistent with the fact that
protection of the child's best interests is the primary purpose for and paramount objective of all
children-oriented provisions of title 10. Id. at 5.
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termination would be in the best interests of the children. 134
Despite the risk of misinterpretation created by the current language
of section 1130, recognition by both Oklahoma's appellate courts and
legislature of the courts' duty in custody and juvenile proceedings to pro-
mote the best interests of the child makes it readily apparent that termi-
nation of parental rights should not be ordered unless it also achieves this
goal. Since parent-initiated termination proceedings do not promote the
child's welfare, as argued below,135 they should be abolished. Even if
parent-initiated termination proceedings are not abolished, section 1130
should be revised to eliminate the risk of misinterpretation and make it
abundantly clear that termination of parental rights can only be accom-
plished after a specific judicial finding that termination is in the best in-
terests of the child regardless of who initiates the action or the particular
ground used as the basis for termination.
In sum, the constitutional, common law, and statutory restrictions
on termination of parental rights require that termination must be neces-
sary to protect the child from harm and serve the best interests of the
child. The following two sections discuss why parent-initiated termina-
tion proceedings in Oklahoma do not meet these requirements.
4. Parent-Initiated Termination Proceedings Unnecessary to
Protect a Child from Harm
Close inspection of the statutory grounds and circumstances under
which parent-initiated termination proceedings are brought in Oklahoma
reveals that involuntary parent-initiated proceedings cannot survive the
constitutional test for extinguishing a fundamental right. 3 6 Termination
in this context is unnecessary to protect a child from harm because under
current Oklahoma law, less restrictive alternatives are available to rem-
edy legitimate concerns regarding the child's welfare.
One ground available in parent-initiated proceedings to terminate
134. 730 P.2d 524, 526 (Okla. 1986) (The court reversed the order of termination on the ground
that § 1130(D) was not in effect at the time the termination order was issued and the court thus had
no statutory authority to terminate in a parent-initiated action at that time.).
135. See infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the constitutional
standard in Oklahoma, based on decisions of the United States Supreme Court and Oklahoma
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the rights of the other parent without that parent's consent is abandon-
ment by a custodial parent.1 37 While in some cases a child may have
been "abandoned" by being left in the care of persons who are fully meet-
ing the child's physical, mental, emotional, and financial needs, this may
not always be the case. 138 Certainly, the "harm" from which the child is
to be protected when abandoned by a custodial parent would be the po-
tential or actual lack of physical care, financial support, guidance, educa-
tion, and emotional support that every child needs. Even in cases where
the child's needs are being fulfilled by caregivers who have assumed these
responsibilities, the fact that the abandoning parent retains legal custody
may cause instability and uncertainty that could be harmful for the child.
Nevertheless, while abandonment might cause harm to the child, in
cases in which the other parent seeks termination on this ground a much
less restrictive alternative exists to protect the child. The noncustodial
parent can simply seek legal custody of the child by filing a motion to
modify custody.13 9 Certainly, in any case where the actions of the custo-
dial parent amount to abandonment justifying termination of the custo-
dial parent's rights, standards for transferring legal custody to the
noncustodial parent would be satisfied." The harm from which the
child is to be protected would then be averted since the petitioning par-
ent, by obtaining legal and physical custody, would presumably be in a
position to fulfill the child's needs. Moreover, the abandoning parent
would not be excused from the duty to provide future financial support,
137. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(2) (Supp. 1987). See supra note 24 for the full text of
§ 1130.
138. Cf Russell v. O'Neill (In re O'Neill), 554 P.2d 864, 865 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (child was
well cared for by the individuals with whom the child was left by the "abandoning parent").
139. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277 (Supp. 1987) authorizes a court to modify a previous order
awarding child custody, entered in an action for divorce, annulment or legal separation, either before
or after final judgment in the action, "whenever circumstances render such change proper." Cus-
tody orders entered in other types of proceedings are similarly subject to modification. See Grose v.
Romero, 193 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Okla. 1948) (guardianship proceeding).
140. In order for a custody order to be modified, the burden of proof rests with the parent asking
that custody be changed to show "(a) that, since the making of the order sought to be modified, there
has been a permanent, substantial and material change of conditions which directly affects the best
interests of the minor child, and (b) that, as a result of such change in conditions, the minor child
would be substantially better off, with respect to its temporal and its mental and moral welfare, if the
requested change in custody be ordered." Gibbons v. Gibbons, 442 P.2d 482, 485 (Okla. 1968). Eg.,
Hornbeck v. Hornbeck, 702 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Okla. 1985); Boatsman v. Boatsman, 697 P.2d 516, 517
(Okla. 1984). "Abandonment is conduct demonstrating a conscious disregard of the obligations a
parent owes her child to such extent that the parent-child relationship is destroyed." Russell v.
O'Neill (In re O'Neill), 554 P.2d 864, 871 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976). If a parent petitioning for termina-
tion of parental rights could prove abandonment, then surely the abandoning parent's conduct
would constitute a change of conditions which directly affects the best interests of the minor child
and indicates the child would be better off with a change of custody.
[Vol. 24:299
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as would be the case where the abandoning parent's rights were
terminated.
14 1
Even in the extremely unlikely event that a noncustodial parent
would petition to terminate a custodial parent's rights but be unable to
assume legal custody, transferring custody to an appropriate caregiver
through guardianship proceedings142 would more directly serve to pro-
tect the child from harm than would termination of the abandoning par-
ent's rights.143 If no appropriate caregiver exists, the state should assume
responsibility through juvenile proceedings'" making parent-initiated
proceedings unnecessary. In short, under any circumstances in which a
parent would seek involuntary termination of the other parent's rights on
the ground of abandonment, the "harm" from which the child is to be
protected can be remedied by a change of custody, a much less drastic
means.
The other ground available to one parent who seeks the involuntary
termination of the other parent's rights is willful nonsupport. 145 This
ground is only available to terminate the parental rights of noncustodial
parents.' 46 The only "harm" from which the child could be protected by
termination on this ground is inadequate financial support and any re-
sulting deprivation.
In the first place, termination of parental rights on the ground of
willful nonpayment of support is grossly overinclusive because it allows
termination of a fundamental right regardless of whether it is necessary
141. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
142. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 2-101 (Supp. 1988) authorizes the court to appoint a guardian for a
minor "when it appears necessary or convenient." However, the Oklahoma courts have repeatedly
held that where custody is awarded to a third person rather than the natural parents, the parents
"must be affirmatively, not comparatively, shown to be unfit with the evidence of unfitness clear and
conclusive and the necessity for depriving the parent of custody shown to be imperative." Weber v.
Linch, 579 P.2d 213, 215 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978). E.g., Haralson v. Haralson, 595 P.2d 443, 445
(Okla. 1979).
143. If the petitioning parent were permanently unable to care for the child and desired to allow
the child to be adopted, a parent-initiated termination proceeding under § 1130 is not necessary to
accomplish this goal. The petitioning parent could relinquish her parental rights to the state, pursu-
ant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 28 (Supp. 1986), 29 (1981) and the state could institute juvenile
proceedings and seek termination under § 1130(B). Alternatively, termination of the abandoning
parent's rights could be sought, on application of the consenting parent pursuant to § 60.7 (Supp.
1983) on grounds of willful failure to support for the preceding twelve months according to the
abandoning parent's financial ability to contribute to the child's support.
144. The state may petition the court to adjudicate the child deprived, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§§ 1101(4) (Supp. 1987), 1103 (Supp. 1982), on grounds of abandonment, and request that custody
be given to the Department of Human Services and the child placed in foster care, or the state can
seek termination of parental rights. Id. §§ 1116 (Supp. 1986), 1130 (Supp. 1987).
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to protect a child from financial hardship. In many cases where a non-
custodial parent is willfully failing to pay the full amount of court-or-
dered support, or according to the parent's means if no order of support
is in effect, the custodial parent may still be able to meet the child's finan-
cial needs. 147 While the nonpayment of support is certainly undesirable
and unfair to the custodial parent in these situations, it should not be
grounds to extinguish a fundamental right when it is not necessary to the
compelling state interest-protection of the child from harm. In
Zablocki v. Redhail,4 the United States Supreme Court rejected one
justification for a statute restricting the fundamental right to marry be-
cause it was substantially overinclusive: it restricted the right to marry
for many persons whose ability to support their children would not be
impaired by the marriage."' Section 1130 must be viewed as similarly
overinclusive because it allows termination of parental rights on grounds
of willful nonpayment even when the child is not harmed by the
nonpayment.
An even more serious flaw is that termination of parental rights on
grounds of willful nonsupport bears no logical relationship to the allevia-
tion of the harm from which the child is to be protected-inadequate
financial support. Entering an order terminating parental rights contrib-
utes nothing to the custodial parent's ability to collect back support from
147. Id. § 1130. Section 1130 authorizes a parent to petition to terminate the parental rights of
the other noncustodial parent if the noncustodial parent has willfully failed to contribute to the
support of the child as provided in a court order or, if no support order was in effect, in accordance
with the parent's ability to pay. The statute makes no distinction between situations in which the
child to be supported has suffered any financial deprivation or hardship or, for that matter, any
consequences whatsoever, and situations in which the child has suffered no harm. Id. It is interest-
ing to note that in more than one instance where one parent has filed proceedings to terminate the
other parent's rights on the basis of nonsupport, the petitioning parent has at some point refused a
tender of child support or consciously discouraged the noncustodial parent from paying support.
Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1105 n.6 (Okla. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in L.R.R. v.
R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988); In re Adoption of Gregory, 495 P.2d 1275, 1276
(Okla. 1972); William K. v. Rebecca K. (In re Adoption of A.G.K.), 728 P.2d 1,8 (Okla. Ct. App.
1986). Such conduct on the part of the custodial parent would suggest the parent's conviction that
the child's financial needs were being adequately met without the support and that the parent's true
goal was termination of the parental rights of his or her ex-spouse. See also Mullins v. Mullins, 606
P.2d 573, 574 (Okla. 1980) ("A child may be receiving excellent care from the custodial parent,
while the noncustodial parent refuses to obey a court order to contribute to the child's support.").
148. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
149. Id. at 390. In Zablocki, the Court examined the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute
which denied the right to marry to Wisconsin residents who were noncustodial parents obligated by
court order to pay child support, unless the marriage applicant could demonstrate compliance with
the support obligation and that the children were not then nor likely to become public charges. Id.
at 375. The Court found the statute substantially overinclusive when justified as serving the interests
of children by providing incentive to pay support, because in many cases marriage could substan-
tially improve the financial situation of the marriage applicant. Id. at 390.
[Vol. 24:299
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the parent whose rights have been terminated."' 0 Termination of a non-
custodial parent's rights thus produces no income for the child, and, par-
adoxically, it extinguishes that parent's duty to support the child
following termination.151 In the context of parent-initiated proceedings,
termination thus makes no sense whatsoever as a remedy for the financial
hardship the child may have suffered from the past nonpayment of sup-
port. It serves only to increase the financial hardship that nonpayment of
support may have caused by canceling the obligation for future support.
The fact that some courts have interpreted section 1130 to allow termina-
tion even after all back support has been tendered 52 further belies the
notion that termination on the grounds of willful nonsupport is necessary
or even intended to protect the child.
A proponent of termination on the ground of nonpayment of sup-
port might argue that it is the threat of termination of parental rights
which protects children from financial hardship, because the availability
of such a remedy might motivate noncustodial parents to pay support.
The contention that the mere prophylactic effect of retaining the option
to terminate constitutes a compelling state interest is certainly of dubious
constitutional validity. The compelling state interest recognized as a jus-
tification for termination-protection of the child of the parent whose
rights are to be terminated-is twisted to become protection of children
not involved in the terminated relationship, even though this may be at
the expense of the child whose parental relationship is severed. 153 Extin-
guishing the benefits to be derived from the parent-child relationship for
both parent and child, on the theory that other children may be pro-
tected, is grossly unfair to the parent and particularly to the child in-
volved. Moreover, such a justification allows termination based only
upon the speculation that other parents might be persuaded to pay child
support as a result of the retention and application of termination on the
150. Termination of parental rights does nothing to enhance collection of the overdue child sup-
port under the many methods now available in Oklahoma. For a discussion of these methods, see
supra note 176.
Section 1130(D) is subject to the same criticism made by the United States Supreme Court in
Zablocki of the Wisconsin statute restricting the right to marry, i.e., it prevents exercise of a funda-
mental right "without delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant's prior children."
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389.
151. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
152. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1105 n.6. (Okla. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in
L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988). The trial court in Davis ordered termi-
nation after the father had tendered into court $2,200 in back due support. This decision was over-
turned on appeal on other grounds.
153. See infra note 174-211 and accompanying text.
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ground of nonpayment. Ironically, the validity of the theory is under-
mined every time termination is ordered on the ground of nonpayment,
because the court's finding of willful nonpayment confirms that the par-
ent in that case was not motivated to pay by the threat of termination of
parental rights. Moreover, allowing a fundamental right to be abolished
on the basis of a compelling state interest that is speculative fails to meet
the standard of strict scrutiny, which requires that the action impairing a
fundamental right be "closely tailored"1"4 to achieve the compelling state
interest.
Even if the motivation to pay support is regarded as a compelling
state interest, there are many less restrictive alternatives available in
Oklahoma to motivate noncustodial parents to pay support. Willful non-
payment of support may be criminally prosecuted, with punishment
ranging up to ten years imprisonment. 15 Parents who willfully disobey
court orders providing for payment of child support can also be impris-
oned through civil contempt proceedings for up to six months and fined
up to $500.156 Through garnishment or income assignment proceedings,
up to fifty to sixty-five percent of a parent's earnings can be withheld and
applied toward payment of support and arrearages.15 7 A parent's state
and federal income tax returns may be intercepted."' 8 A lien in the
amount of the arrearage may be placed against the parent's real and per-
sonal property.1 59 Information regarding child support arrearages ex-
ceeding $1000 may be released to consumer reporting agencies. 160
Parents can be ordered by the court to post a bond, security, or other
guarantee to ensure payment of child support. 6 ' Parents found to be
unemployed or underemployed can be ordered to participate in job find-
ing or job training programs. 162 Thus, termination of parental rights on
the ground of willful nonpayment of support is not necessary to motivate
noncustodial parents to pay child support and thereby protect children
from financial hardship.
154. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). See J. NOWAK, supra note 83 at 530.
155. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 851 (1981), 852 (Supp. 1987), 853 (1981).
156. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1291(D) (Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 566 (Supp. 1984).
157. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1171.2 (Supp. 1985).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1986) (federal tax refund intercept); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 205.3 (Supp.
1985) (state tax refund intercept).
159. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289.1 (Supp. 1987).
160. OKLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 240.7 (Supp. 1987).
161. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277.5 (Supp. 1985).
162. OKLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 240.10 (Supp. 1987).
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In Zablocki v. Redhail, 163 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that restricted the funda-
mental right to marry of noncustodial parents who were behind in child
support or whose children were public charges. The state's profferred
justification for this statute was to promote the welfare of children by
providing incentive for the applicant to make support payments. 164 The
Court rejected this justification on the ground that restriction of the fun-
damental right was unnecessary to achieve the state's interest, because
wage assignments, contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties avail-
able under Wisconsin law were already available to exact compliance
with support obligations, and were at least as effective as the statute
under scrutiny without impairing a fundamental right.16 If the United
States Supreme Court has rejected the infringement of one familial rela-
tionship because less restrictive alternatives were available to motivate
the payment of child support, it should be abundantly clear that any ef-
fort to justify the abolition of another fundamental familial relationship
under the same rationale, when identical alternatives exist in Oklahoma
to motivate payment of support, will similarly fail to survive strict consti-
tutional scrutiny.1 66
163. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
164. Id. at 389.
165. Id. at 389-90.
166. One Oklahoma appellate court rejected a similar constitutional challenge to OKLA. STAT.
tit. 10, § 60.6 (Supp. 1987), which allows adoption without the consent of a parent who has willfully
failed to substantially comply with a support order for a period of twelve months preceding the filing
of the adoption petition. In Blevins v. Thomas (In re Adoption of Blevins), 695 P.2d 556, 559 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1984), a father contended § 60.6(3) violated his rights to substantive due process and equal
protection because less restrictive means were available to provide support for children that do not
interfere with the fundamental right of a parent-child relationship. In a puzzling opinion, the court
acknowledged that where a fundamental right has been impinged, the court should determine
whether the state has chosen "the least restrictive alternative" to meet its compelling state interest.
The court then totally failed to consider whether a less restrictive alternative existed. Instead, the
court simply found that the compelling state interest for the statute was to protect a child from harm
suffered by financial abandonment and from the ills of protracted foster care (which wasn't a neces-
sary option in that case or in most cases brought under § 60.6 or by custodial parents), and held this
interest outweighed the father's right. Had the court in Blevins actually considered the less restric-
tive alternatives available, rather than paying mere lip service to the test, it would have reached the
same conclusion as the United States Supreme Court in Zablocki, namely, that less restrictive alter-
natives are available to provide support. Even so, § 60.6 and § 1130 are distinguishable, because
termination in anticipation of adoption at least replaces a parent with another who will assume the
responsibility to support. An analysis of less restrictive alternatives is even less likely to result in
upholding parent-initiated termination proceedings under § 1130, where no parent will assume the
responsibilities of the terminated parent.
See also Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: Should Nonpayment of Child Support Be
Enough?, 67 IOWA L. REv. 827, 832-33 (1982) (arguing an Iowa statute allowing termination for
nonpayment of support is unconstitutional because less restrictive alternatives exist in Iowa to com-
pel support).
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Although abandonment and willful nonpayment of support are the
only grounds on which the Oklahoma legislature will permit a parent to
institute proceedings to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the
other parent, proponents of parent-initiated termination may contend
that in some cases proceedings brought for nonpayment of support are in
reality motivated by the concern that visitation with the noncustodial
parent is harmful to the child. As the following section discusses, denial
of visitation is frequently extremely detrimental to a child.167 Moreover,
the legislature has clearly not chosen parent-initiated termination as a
method for remedying harmful effects of visitation, and to use the statute
in this manner flouts legislative intent.
Presumably, one reason the legislature has not included harmful ef-
fects of visitation as a ground for parent-initiated termination proceed-
ings is that termination is not necessary to protect the child from the
perceived harm. Therefore, this ground would fail to survive constitu-
tional analysis. Frequently, any harmful effects of visitation can be
avoided by placing restrictions upon the conditions, time, or manner in
which the visitation takes place.1 6 8 Even in those infrequent cases in
which, with the support of expert testimony, it appears the noncustodial
parent is so physically or psychologically abusive that any form of visita-
tion is detrimental to the child,16 9 the court has the option to terminate
'visitation rights without terminating the entire parent-child relationship.
By terminating only the parental right to visitation, the court ensures
that the child would be protected but still entitled to ongoing financial
support from the noncustodial parent. Moreover, if the situation should
later change and visitation would again be beneficial, the court through
subsequent modification could reinstate the noncustodial parent's visita-
tion rights.' Terminating parental rights, on the other hand, denies a
child the opportunity to establish a relationship with the parent at a later
167. See infra notes 177-211 and accompanying text.
168. Frequently Oklahoma courts place restrictions upon the time, place, or manner in which
visitation is exercised in order to protect a child from a risk of harm from physical or sexual abuse or
substance abuse of the parent. Typical restrictions are to require that visitation take place in the
presence of a third party, such as a grandparent or in extreme cases, a social worker; to prohibit
overnight visitation; to prohibit driving by the noncustodial parent while with the children; or to
require counseling for the noncustodial parent as a condition for the exercise of visitation. See
Gamble v. Gamble, 477 P.2d 383, 388 (Okla. 1970) (supervised visitation unnecessary on facts
presented.).
169. Oklahoma courts have consistently followed a rule that only in exceptional cases should a
parent be denied the right to visit with his or her minor child, where custody is awarded to the other
parent. Gamble, 477 P.2d at 388; Bradford v. Bradford, 327 P.2d 684, 686 (Okla. 1958).
170. Bradford, 327 P.2d at 686. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277 (Supp. 1987).
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time when changes in the parental behavior or in the child may make
visitation desirable.
In sum, a review of the limited grounds available for parent-initiated
proceedings establishes that involuntary termination under section
1130(D) cannot survive constitutional analysis. Because it allows termi-
nation of many relationships in which the child is suffering no harm,
section 1130 (D) is impermissibly overinclusive. Even in situations where
harm has occurred or could occur, parent-initiated termination is unnec-
essary to protect the child because Oklahoma law provides alternatives
which provide the same protection but do not impair fundamental rights.
Moreover, these alternatives avoid some of the detrimental effects termi-
nation has on the child.
5. Failure of Parent-Initiated Termination Proceedings to Serve
the Best Interests of the Child
Because severence of the fundamental relationship between parent
and child deprives the child of crucial benefits, full protection for the
constitutional rights of the child requires preservation of the parent-child
relationship whenever the detriment to the child created by termination
is greater than the harm which would result if the relationship contin-
ues."' A termination which fails to serve the best interests of the child
also violates a fundamental principle of family law recognized by the
Oklahoma courts and legislature. 172 Thus, termination of parental rights
should only be allowed after a specific judicial finding that termination is
in the best interests of the child. Because a new parent will assume the
responsibility of meeting the child's emotional and financial needs, termi-
nation in the context of adoption and juvenile proceedings may, under
some circumstances, be in the best interests of a child. However, termi-
nation in parent-initiated proceedings, whether voluntary or involuntary,
does not serve a child's best interests 173 and may be significantly detri-
mental to the welfare of the child involved.
171. See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
173. Ordinarily, termination does not serve the best interests of the child because it is not neces-
sary to protect the child from harm, and can cause significant psychological harm and financial
hardship. It might be argued that on rare occasions, a unique set of circumstances could arise in
which parent-initiated termination could be in the child's best interests if: the child was extensively
physically or sexually abused; termination of visitation did not allay the child's fears; independent
psychological testimony established that the mere possibility that the court could someday reinstate
visitation was causing serious psychological damage to the child; the child was unlikely to benefit
from visitation in the future; and financial hardship for the child would not result from termination.
However, it is extremely unlikely that such a case would in fact arise. Experts in sexual abuse
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As previously mentioned, termination of parental rights exacerbates
any financial deprivation the child has endured because it extinguishes
the duty to pay child support. 7 4 Although parents whose rights are sub-
ject to termination in parent-initiated proceedings have already failed to
meet their financial obligations, the effect of termination is to prevent the
child from benefiting from future child support otherwise collectible until
the child reaches the age of majority,1 75 either through voluntary pay-
ment or through utilization of stringent statutory procedures now avail-
able to collect child support.176 For some children, this lost support may
mean that necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, and medical care
generally agree that even an abused child is better off having some relationship with both parents.
See Tulsa World, Aug. 28, 1988 at 7, col. 5. If such a case were to arise, it might be appropriately
resolved under a proceeding to free a child from a parent's dominion pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 9 (1981), without terminating the duty to support, or through a juvenile proceeding initiated by
the state. Preservation of parent-initiated proceedings to address such a remote possibility would
disserve the interests of numerous children whose parents might attempt to expand the loophole or
use termination for improper purposes. Moreover, the grounds for parent-initiated terminations do
not indicate that this was the type of situation the legislature intended to address with parent-initi-
ated proceedings. See supra notes 167-70. In fact, the 1987 amendment to § 1130(B), deleting the
child abuse grounds for parent-initiated proceedings, suggests that the legislature did not intend that
parent-initiated termination be used for this purpose.
174. See supra note 21.
175. In Oklahoma, a child is entitled to support by the parents until the child reaches eighteen,
or, if the child is dependent and still regularly and continuously attending high school, through the
age of eighteen. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277 (Supp. 1987).
176. Within the past ten years, methods for collection of child support have been greatly ex-
panded and strengthened, in part due to the mandate of the federal Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984. 42 U.S.C. § 651 (1985). See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1171.2 (Supp.
1985), 1171.3 (Supp. 1986), 1171.4 (Supp. 1985), 1277.4 (Supp. 1985) (creating procedures for vol-
untary and mandatory income assignment); Id. § 1277.5 (Supp. 1985) (authorizes court to require
security, bond, or other guarantee to ensure payment of child support); Id. § 1277.3 (1981) (allows
collection of 10% interest on child support arrearages); Id. § 1289.1 (Supp. 1987) (procedure to
obtain llen upon real and personal property for arrearage in child support payments); Id. § 1291
(Supp. 1987) (allows child support arrearages, in certain circumstances, to become a judgment by
operation of law); Id. §§ 1171.2 (Supp. 1985), 1173.1 (Supp. 1986) (provisions for garnishment of
50% to 65% of disposable earnings for child support and order for continuing garnishment for child
support); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 205.3 (Supp. 1985) (state tax refund intercept for child suport ar-
rearages); 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1986) (federal tax refund intercept); OKLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 240.1-.8
(Supp. 1985) (expedited administrative proceedings and availability of assistance from Department
of Human Services to collect child support); Id. § 240.7 (Supp. 1985) (provision for release of child
support arreage information to consumer reporting agencies); Id. § 240.10 (Supp. 1987) (administra-
tive proceeding to require unemployed or underemployed parent in arrears to participate in job
finding or job training programs).
In addition, criminal enforcement remedies, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 851 (1981), 852 (Supp.
1987), 853 (1981); contempt proceedings, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289.1 (Supp. 1987), OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 566 (Supp. 1984); and interstate collection proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1600.1-.38 (1981), are still available to collect child
support.
The new enforcement mechanisms appear to be achieving some success. The Department of
Human Services reported a 25.8% increase in child support collected from fiscal year 1985 to fiscal
year 1986 and another 29.7% increase in child support collected from fiscal year 1986 to fiscal year
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will not be adequately provided. Even if the custodial parent can meet
the child's basic physical needs, the child may nonetheless forego educa-
tional opportunities and other occasions for cultural enrichment that
could have been afforded by continuing financial support.
In addition to potential financial hardship, termination of parental
rights can cause significant psychological and emotional damage to the
child because it extinguishes a parent's right to visitation. Recent litera-
ture and case studies by psychologists and social scientists indicate that
cutting a child off from all contact with a natural parent can have signifi-
cantly detrimental effects.' 77 For example, studies show that children
who do not have substantial contact with both parents suffer reduced
I.Q. and cognitive performance. 178  Infrequent visitation has similarly
been linked with poor school performance by children who had per-
formed satisfactorily prior to the separation or divorce. 1 79  Studies also
1987. 1986-1987 OKLA. DEPT. OF HUM. SERV. ANN. REP. 88; 1985-1986 OKLA. DEPT. OF HUM.
SERV. ANN. REP. 50.
The Family Support Act of 1988, Public L. No. 100-485, - Stat. - (1988), recently enacted by
Congress, requires further reform of the states' child support enforcement statutes which should
enhance future child support collection efforts.
177. See Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects of Ideology and Mediation on Child
Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 2 INT. J. OF L. AND THE FAM. 106
(1988). Bruch observes that, consistent with the developing ideas regarding what serves children's
welfare, "custody law has increasingly emphasized maintaining relationships with all important
figures in the child's life," responding to research literature which emphasizes the benefits for the
children of continued contact with the noncustodial parent-usually the father. Id. at 110.
Bruch notes that the influential book by J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979), which recommends that the custodial parent have unilateral
control over the nature and extent of the other parent's contact with child, met with a hostile recep-
tion. Although it influenced custody law for a period of time, movement has now swung in the
opposite direction and their recommendation has been uniformly rejected. Id. at 108-09.
178. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L. Q. 345 (1979) (citing Santrock, Relation of Type and
Onset of Father Absence to Cognitive Development, 43 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 445 (1972)). This
article discusses a study which compared I.Q. and achievement test scores for father-absent and
father-present third and sixth grade boys. The study found that father absence due to divorce, deser-
tion or separation had the most negative impact on test scores. Id. at 358. In H. BILLER, FATHER,
CHILD AND SEX ROLE: PATERNAL DETERMINANTS OF PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1971), a
summary of the results of six studies of middle and lower class children suggests father-absent chil-
dren suffer from intellectual deficits, score lower on intelligence and aptitude tests, and are more
hampered in their cognitive functioning than children from the same classes whose fathers are pres-
ent. Id. at 57-59.
179. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PAR-
ENTS COPE wrrH DIVORCE 283 (1980). Wallerstein and Kelly conducted a study of 60 families over
the five years following divorce. The study included counseling parents and children for six weeks
around the time of the divorce, a follow-up interview one year to 18 months following the divorce,
and a follow-up interview five years after the divorce. The study dealt primarily with custodial
mothers and noncustodial fathers. The majority of the families in the study were white and middle
or upper class. In their report, they observed that the father's nonavailability to a child and an
erratic, infrequent visiting pattern were significant factors affecting the poor school performance for
the group of children who had begun to fail only in the aftermath of the separation and divorce. Id.
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suggest a correlation between the absence of a father during childhood
and poor occupational adjustment and unemployment later as an
adult.18 Destruction of the relationship between a child and parent may
also inhibit the proper development of conscience and moral
guidelines. 81
While any divorce is emotionally traumatic for the children in-
volved, infrequent visitation or an absence of visitation with the noncus-
todial parent has been found to contribute significantly to long-range
clinical depression and other disabling symptomatic behavior. Psycholo-
gists Wallerstein and Kelly studied sixty families over a five-year period
following divorce182 and consistently found that the children who were
not visited or rarely visited by their fathers suffered a high incidence of
depression."13 Both at the eighteen-month follow-up visit, 184 and even
more markedly at the interview five years after the divorce, most of the
children not visited suffered from underlying or overt depression accom-
panied by disabling symptomatic behaviors.' 85 These children grieved
for the absent parent 8 6 and experienced a sense of rejection and low self-
esteem.1 87 The psychologists observed that "the unvisited or poorly vis-
ited child was likely to feel unloved and unloveable."' 88 By contrast,
evaluation five years after the divorce revealed that in children of both
sexes and all ages, good relationships with the noncustodial parent ap-
peared to be linked to high self-esteem and the absence of depression.' 89
180. H. BILLER, supra note 178, at 76. One of the several studies reported by Biller found Peace
Corps volunteers whose fathers were absent during their childhood were much more likely not to
complete their scheduled overseas tours. Id.
181. Magid & Oborn, Children of Divorce: A Need for Guidelines, 20 FAM. L. Q. 331, 335
(1986). (Dr. Magid is a licensed clinical psychologist and director of psychology sciences at Golden
Medical Clinic in Golden, Colorado; Dr. Oborn, an M.S.W. and Ph.D., has engaged in private
practice in clinical social work since 1965 specializing in domestic and family relations); H. BILLER,
supra note 178, at 64-66 (summarizing several psychological studies, including one of seventh grade
boys which found father-absent boys scored consistently lower than father-present boys on a variety
of moral indexes); D. LYNN, THE FATHER: His ROLE IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 266-67 (1974).
182. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179.
183. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 309.
184. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 172.
185. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 248. At least some portion of the failure
of noncustodial parents to visit was related to resistance or refusal to comply by the custodial parent.
Id. at 125, 170-71. In other cases, the failure to visit was by choice of the noncustodial parent,
resulting from a variety of psychological factors. Id. at 123-31.
186. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 208.
187. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 208, 218.
188. J. WALLERSTEIN & 3. KELLY, supra note 179, at 218.
189. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 219. Even children who were doing
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Other psychological studies have reached the same conclusions.190
Separation from a natural parent can be harmful regardless of the
age of the child. Even a toddler who loses contact with a natural parent
may perceive the separation as abandonment. 191 One study reported that
children who experienced total abandonment by a parent at a very young
age later experienced grief, sadness, and a longing for the relationship.
These emotions were frequently accompanied by "searching behavior,"
where the child looks at the faces of people in stores hoping to have
instant recognition of the parent about whom they have no memory. 192
Disruption of the parental bonding process, even for very young chil-
dren, may induce rage. According to social scientists, this rage "can sim-
mer for years and some day manifest itself in a variety of forms, ranging
from antisocial criminal acts to suicide and abuse or neglect of their own
children."'1 93
A child's social development may also be significantly impaired by
termination of one parent's visitation rights.1 94 Relationships with peers,
for example, can be negatively affected.' 95 In addition, psychologists re-
port that "[a]dult clients who lost contact with one parent during the
early years often exhibit numerous difficulties in developing and/or
maintaining ongoing attachments as an adult."' 96 Furthermore, a child's
development of sex role identification may be impaired. Because fathers
have traditionally been the noncustodial parents, several studies have fo-
cused on the effect of the father's absence on a child's sex-role identifica-
tion.1 97  The relationship between father and son is particularly
190. See W. HODGES, INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 8, 60-62 (1986) (Hodges,
associate professor of psychology at the University of Colorado, suggests that abandonment by a
noncustodial parent is particularly devastating for a child because the child determines he or she is
unloveable and suffers a loss of self-esteem.); H. BILLER, supra note 178, at 77 (summarizes studies
indicating children whose fathers are absent are more likely to exhibit depression and feelings of loss
to a pathological degree).
191. P. WOOLLEY, THE CUSTODY HANDBOOK 103-04 (1979).
192. W. HODGES, supra note 190, at 14, 61 (Hodges, summarizing the study of L. TEsSMAN,
CHILDREN OF PARTING PARENTS (1978), reports one ten year old rode all over town on his bicycle
the day his stepfather was to adopt him, hoping to recognize his biological father whom he had not
seen since he was two.).
193. Magid & Oborn, supra note 181, at 334.
194. Magid & Oborn, supra note 181, at 335; H. BILLER, supra note 178, at 68-70.
195. H. BILLER, supra note 178, at 68-70, 76, 77, 109, 111 (Biller's summaries of studies of
paternal absence reported that development of successful peer relationships for both boys and girls
was impaired.).
196. Magid & Oborn, supra note 181, at 336. Biller reported that a study indicated the absence
of a father early in a daughter's life was significantly related to difficulty the daughter had as an adult
in interactions with males. H. BILLER, supra note 178, at 110-111. For similar findings regarding
adolescent girls, see D. LYNN, supra note 181, at 260-62.
197. H. BILLER, supra note 178. See also D. LYNN, supra note 196, at 255.
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important to the development of a young boy's sexual identification.198
The importance of the father-daughter relationship in the daughter's sex
role development has also received recent recognition. 199
Proponents of parent-initiated termination proceedings might argue
that in many of these cases the existing relationship between the parent
to be terminated and the child is less than ideal. Visitations may already
be irregular and marred by the conflict existing between the two parents.
Psychologists have recognized, however, that biological parents continue
to be significant in a child's development, even when only intermittent
and inadequate contact has occurred,2 °" and even if the child's relation-
ship with a parent during the marriage was not particularly strong.20 1
One reason for this is the function the biological parents serve as a source
of identity for a child.20 2 A child's self-perception is molded by what the
child "knows and imagines about the biological family, ' 20 3 and a child's
sense of self-respect is influenced by characteristics the child perceives as
most likeable about the parents. 2 4 Moreover, children who do not have
regular contact with a biological parent or parents fantasize about the
absent parent, and their desire for love from that parent may create un-
realistic images of the lost parental love.20 5 It is important for the child's
development for the child to be able to see his or her biological parents
198. H. BILLER, supra note 178, at 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13 & 18 (Biller observes that a relationship with
the father is of particular importance during the first three years of life, which are crucial in the
formation of an individual's sex role orientation.). See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note
179, at 68-69.
199. H. BILLER, supra note 178, at 105-112.
200. Beyer & Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their Effect on Termination of Parental
Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L. Q. 233, 237 (1986) (Beyer is a clinical psychologist practicing in
Washington, D.C.); J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 122, 307.
201. Wallerstein and Kelly found that a child's distress following separation from the noncus-
todial parent was not affected by the quality of the parent-child relationship prior to separation.
Intense longing for the noncustodial parent occurred among children whose prior relationship
ranged from abusive and critical to warm and caring. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179,
at 53, 54, 68. More surprising was the fact that eighteen months after separation, there was no
correlation between the visiting pattern and frequency and the strength of the pre-divorce parent-
child relationship. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 122. Moreover, while the
majority of the visiting parents were fathers, they.found the role of the visiting parent was not sex-
linked and the characteristics of the visiting relationship appeared tied to the visiting role itself. J.
WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 122.
202. Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 200, at 237. See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY,
supra note 179, at 238.
203. Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 200, at 238.
204. Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 200, at 238.
205. Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 200, at 238; J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at
156 (Even where the noncustodial parent was psychologically ill, the psychologists observed that
prohibiting visitation could boomerang because children, "out of their own intense need, can all too
readily idealize the parent they are prohibited from seeing.").
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from an accurate perspective."0 6 Children can benefit from resumption
of visitation, even when it has been irregular or absent for some period of
time.2 0 7 Moreover, even when the child's relationship with the noncus-
todial parent has some detrimental aspects, it is important to maintain it
in some form to protect the child from the sense of loss and rejection that
would follow if the relationship were destroyed. 08
The importance of visitation to children is further affirmed by re-
sponses given during interviews of children of divorced families. In their
five-year study of sixty divorced families, Wallerstein and Kelly docu-
mented that children in the sole custody of one parent after divorce gen-
erally desire more contact with the noncustodial parent than traditional
visitation arrangements typically provide. Wallerstein and Kelly re-
ported that "[c]omplaints about insufficiency of parental visits were
heard not just from those youngsters who rarely saw the absent parent,
but from many who were being visited rather frequently as well.... The
intense longing for greater contact persisted undiminished over many
years. 20
9
The Oklahoma courts have recognized that visitation between a
child and his or her parent is not just a right of the parent, but also is
intended to serve the needs of the child. In Looper v. McManus, the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals observed that "[v]isitation is not solely for
the benefit of the adult visitor but is aimed at fulfilling what many con-
ceive to be a vital, or at least a wholesome contribution to the child's
206. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 55, 85 (1969) ("No matter what type of parents the child has, sooner or later he must
see them in accurate perspective and eliminate whatever fantasies he may have had about them.").
207. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 253. Wallerstein and Kelly reported
that six children refused to visit a father who sought to maintain contact, due to the youngsters'
intense alignment with an angry mother. Several years later some of these children resumed visiting
and established friendly relationships with the parent. See W. HODGES, supra note 190, at 61.
208. Wallerstein and Kelly observed:
Some of these visiting relationships could even be considered detrimental to development,
because they infanticized the child or hurt his feelings or exploited the relationship to help
the adult. Nevertheless, they played a significant role in protecting the child against the
pain of loss and the psychological impact of that loss. Even in these poor relationships the
father's presence kept the child from worrying about abandonment and total rejection and
the nagging self-doubts which followed. The father also provided a presence, however
limited, which diminished the child's sense of vulnerability and aloneness, and total depen-
dency on one parent. And finally, the father's presence muted the intensity of the child's
conflicts and feelings which otherwise focused on the mother. The maintenance of some
continuity in the father-child relationship, unless the relationship was psychologically or
physically destructive of the child's well-being, appeared preferable to complete loss of
contact, even though the relationship may have been impoverished from its conception or
gradually deteriorated during the years.
J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 239.
209. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 134.
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emotional well-being by permitting partial continuation of an earlier es-
tablished close relationship. 210
In sum, when one parent initiates proceedings to terminate the
rights of the other parent, there is no one before the court who will im-
mediately undertake the responsibility of meeting the child's financial
and emotional needs, as in adoption proceedings, and no agency that will
immediately begin efforts to find a replacement parent, as is the goal of
most juvenile proceedings.21I Termination thus deprives the child of the
financial, emotional, and psychological benefits which would be derived
from preservation of the relationship, with no corresponding benefit. As
discussed in the previous section, any harm that termination is sought to
prevent can be avoided by less restrictive alternatives which are not ac-
companied by the same detrimental effects that termination has on the
child.21 2 For this reason, termination of parental rights in parent-initi-
ated proceedings fails to serve the best interests of the child. Thus, both
voluntary and involuntary parent-initiated proceedings violate the consti-
tutional rights of the child 21 3 and also contravene the fundamental prin-
ciple long adhered to by the Oklahoma courts and legislature, that in
matters relating to the care and custody of children, the courts must act
to serve the best interests of the child.
B. Inappropriate Justification of Termination of Parental Rights as a
Sanction for Nonpayment of Child Support
If parent-initiated termination of parental rights does not promote
the welfare of the child, what other reasons exist for allowing parent-
initiated termination proceedings? With respect to involuntary termina-
tion, there is a real risk that termination of parental rights may be used as
the ultimate sanction for nonpayment of child support, and that the best
interests of the child will be overlooked in the zeal to punish the recalci-
trant parent.21 4
210. 581 P.2d 487, 488 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (court granted visitation rights to a stepmother
who had acted as surrogate parent to a young child for several years).
In Bingham v. Bingham, 629 P.2d 1297 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981), the appellate court observed that
an agreement between parents denying the father visitation rights deprived the children of the "com-
panionship, training, care and nurturing to which they [were] entitled." Id. at 1300.
211. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 137-70.
213. See supra notes 102-19.
214. This fear is not totally hypothetical. Indeed the trial judge in Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d
1102, 1105 & n.7 (Okla. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.),
763 P.2d 94, 100 n.18 (Okla. 1988), when considering termination of a father's rights for nonpay-
ment of support in a parent-initiated proceeding, stated that he interpreted the statute to require him
[Vol. 24:299
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Evidence that termination is often viewed primarily as a sanction is
found in arguments of proponents of parent-initiated termination pro-
ceedings who contend that it is unjust to allow an irresponsible parent to
"escape his responsibilities, but continue to enjoy the benefits of
parenthood, including visitation, rights of inheritance and rights to the
children's earnings." '215 Termination has been described as a remedial
right of the child entitled to support, l 6 and it has been argued that to
deny this right to a child without an adoptive parent waiting in the wings
is a denial of equal protection.21 7
Such arguments lose sight of the ultimate goal to be accomplished
by the termination of parental rights. If termination is constitutionally
justified, it can only be because it is necessary to protect the child from
harm.21 8 The mere infliction of punishment upon a nonconforming par-
ent is not a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify abolition of a
fundamental right. But the parent's rights aside, burdening the child
with the detrimental effects of termination 19 is hardly an equitable solu-
tion for punishing the parent. Extinguishing all rights of the child clearly
fails to serve the child's best interests.
Moreover, many alternatives exist to punish a parent who has failed
to pay support. Willful nonpayment of support may be punished with up
to ten years imprisonment through criminal prosecution 220 and with im-
prisonment up to six months and a $500 fine through civil contempt pro-
ceedings.221 Other methods and strategies for collection exist, such as
to terminate the father's rights upon proof of willful failure to support for the preceding year, even
though the father had tendered to the court the sum of the arrearages. By declaring that the court
had no choice, the clear implication was that he felt he had no discretion to even consider the child's
best interests. Although the court of appeals reversed, holding the judge was mistaken in his belief
he had no choice, the language of the statute clearly fosters such an approach.
215. Mullins v. Mullins (In re Mullins), 606 P.2d 573, 574 (Okla. 1980) In In re Mullins, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the validity of parent-initiated termination proceedings brought
under the authority of title 10, § 1130. In re Mullins was subsequently overruled in Davis, 708 P.2d
at 1111, which held that parents had no standing to institute termination proceedings under the
statutory scheme then existing. This quote from In re Mullins was also included in Judge Wilson's
dissent in Davis, 708 P.2d at 1116.
216. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1115 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1117-18 (Kauger, J., dissenting).
218. See supra notes 87-94.
219. See supra notes 174-211.
220. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 851 (1981), 852 (Supp. 1987), 853 (1981).
221. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 566 (Supp. 1984).
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income assignment, 222 garnishment, 223 tax refund interception, 224 and re-
lease of child support arrearage information to consumer reporting agen-
221cies, which are not implemented for punishment but certainly have
negative effects on the noncomplying parent. Thus, even if punishment
were considered a compelling state interest, termination is unnecessary to
accomplish this goal.
Utilization of termination of parental rights as a sanction for non-
payment of support therefore violates the constitutional rights of both
the parent and the child. Because termination deprives the child of im-
portant benefits and can cause the child significant harm, any attempt to
justify use of termination to punish a parent must be rejected.
C. Inappropriate Use of Parent-Initiated Termination to Serve the
Needs of Parents
The ability of one parent to initiate proceedings to terminate the
other's parental rights creates a substantial risk that the proceedings will
be employed to serve the emotional needs of the initiating parent rather
than the child. In the vast majority of cases, parent-initiated termination
proceedings are brought by parents who are divorced or separated from
the other parent.226 Separation, particularly in divorce, frequently cre-
ates significant hostility on the part of one parent toward the other.22 v
The availability of termination proceedings provides the ultimate oppor-
tunity to get even.2 28
It is not uncommon for custodial parents to communicate to their
attorneys a strong desire that their ex-spouses have no visitation with
their children. Frequently the motivation expressed is a preference to
222. Eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1171.2 (Supp. 1987), 1171.3 (Supp. 1986), 1171.4 (Supp.
1985), 1277.4 (Supp. 1985).
223. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1171.2 (Supp. 1985), 1173.1 (Supp. 1986).
224. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 205.3 (Supp. 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 664 (Supp. 1986).
225. OKLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 240.7 (Supp. 1985).
226. See supra note 23.
227. Following their five-year study of 60 divorced families in the San Francisco area, Waller-
stein and Kelly observed that "[flour-fifths of all the men and an even higher proportion of the
women expressed anger and bitterness toward their spouses. Thus in almost every family [studied],
there was at least one, if not two, angry parents." The authors perceived the women as clearly more
hostile than the men, and found that the intensity of their anger was greater. They described bitter
and explosive interactions between the parents as the hallmark of the divorce experience for most of
the youngsters. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 26.
228. In Gamble v. Gamble, 477 P.2d 383 (Okla. 1970), the court commented upon the truth of
the trial judge's remark from the bench: "The Court is also aware - I run into it all the time in
these divorce cases - each parent likes to use the children to get back at their husband or wife. In
other words, if everything else fails, they will go to that angle." Id. at 388. In Gamble, the court
denied a mother's request for restrictions upon the father's visitation. Id. at 383.
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have their ex-spouses out of their lives completely and to avoid the com-
munication, contact, and resulting stress that visitation normally necessi-
tates.229 Although the majority of custodial parents do make some effort
to observe visitation rights, the resistance of a significant number of cus-
todial parents to visitation is well documented by psychologists who have
studied the interaction of parents and children following divorce.230 In
their five-year study of divorced families, Wallerstein and Kelly reported
that one-fifth of the custodial parents saw no value whatsoever in contin-
ued contact by the noncustodial parent with the children and actively
tried to sabotage the visitation.231 Some of the custodial parents within
this group sought assistance from attorneys to discontinue the
visitation.232
Evidence that personal motivations have prompted the filing of par-
ent-initiated termination proceedings is found in the fact that some initi-
ating parents have actively discouraged payment of support or even
refused a tender of back due support so as not to prejudice their chances
of obtaining termination of the other parent's rights.233
The risk that termination is being sought to serve the interest of a
229. Wallerstein and Kelly reported that visitation "evoked in both parents the ghosts of the
failed marriage and the fantasies of what might have been." Even where there was little or no
contact, they observed that visitation was stressful because it presented a continuing opportunity for
the "replay of anger, jealousy, love, mutual rejection, and longing between the divorcing adults."
Particularly during the first year following separation, the great majority of both women and men
found visitation "moderately or severely" stressful. The psychologists observed that one-third of the
children studied were "consistently exposed to intense anger at visiting time." J. WALLERSTEIN & J.
KELLY, supra note 179, at 125.
230. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 125-26, 170.
231. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 125. One mother reportedly became so
distraught that she smeared dog feces on her husband's face when he arrived to see the children.
232. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 179, at 126. See Bingham v. Bingham, 629 P.2d
1297, 1298-1300 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (Mother "bartered away the children's right to be parentally
and financially supported" by father in exchange for father's agreement to forgo his right to visita-
tion, an agreement which the court observed had the practical effect of terminating the parental
rights of the father.).
233. Eg., in Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1105 n.6 (Okla. 1985), superseded by statute as stated
in L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988), the father tendered to the court the
sum of $2,200 when he was served with the motion to terminate his parental rights. The mother
refused the money and advised the judge at trial, "I want his rights terminated, so I didn't accept the
money."
See also William K. v. Rebecca K. (In re Adoption of A.G.K.), 728 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Ct. App.
1986) (Custodial father discouraged payment of child support with interest of obtaining termination
in stepparent adoption); In re Adoption of Gregory, 495 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Okla. 1972) (Custodial
mother continually refused attempts to pay support in order to terminate father's rights in steppar-
ent adoption); Griffith v. Griffith, 730 P.2d 524, 525 (Okla. 1986) (Where noncustodial mother was
under no court order to pay support, custodial father filed two motions, one to establish child sup-
port and one to terminate her parental rights under § 1130, but at the hearing on his motions he
elected to proceed only on the petition to terminate.).
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parent is not limited to involuntary parent-initiated proceedings. Parents
may also have their own interests at heart when they voluntarily consent
to termination of their parental rights.234 A parent may surrender such
rights as part of an agreement with a custodial parent to avoid contempt
proceedings, criminal prosecutions, or the negative effects of other collec-
tion efforts that might be pursued.235 A parent who consents to termina-
tion may simply want to avoid the responsibility of paying child support
altogether.236
Although parent-initiated termination of parental rights may serve
the interests of one, or occasionally, both parents, it fails to serve the best
interests of the child.2 37  In parent-initiated termination proceedings,
however, the parents are the active litigants. Where the focus is the de-
sire and demand for relief of one parent and the alleged misconduct of
the other, it is easy to lose sight of the child's best interests.238 In cases of
voluntary termination, in which frequently both parents agree to the ter-
mination of one parent's rights, the risk that the child's best interests will
not receive adequate attention is even greater. By contrast, juvenile pro-
ceedings are brought by the state with the primary purpose of protecting
children from harm and ensuring their welfare.23 9
Parent-initiated termination proceedings should not be retained to
serve the personal interests of one or both parents. Because these termi-
nation proceedings violate the constitutional rights of both the child and
a parent whose rights are involuntarily terminated, and fail to serve the
child's best interests whether termination is voluntary or not, the practice
of allowing parents to initiate termination proceedings must be abolished.
234. Termination upon written consent of a parent in parent-initiated proceedings is authorized
in OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(1), (D) (Supp. 1987).
235. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 21. Cf Bingham v. Bingham, 629 P.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (Okla. Ct. App.
1981) (father agreed to waive all rights to visitation at divorce in return for provision in decree which
relieved him of the duty of support).
237. See supra notes 174-213.
238. See Griffith v. Griffith, 730 P.2d 524, 525 (Okla. 1986) (In parent-initiated termination
proceeding, the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed that the trial court's order terminating parental
rights was not based upon a finding of the court that termination would be in the best interests of the
children.); Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1105 n.7 (Okla. 1985) superseded by statute as stated in
L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988). See supra notes 132-34 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of Davis regarding the trial judge's conviction that he had no choice but to
terminate if willful nonsupport was proven.
239. See R.E. v. State (In re A.E.), 743 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Okla. 1987); Davis, 708 P.2d at 1109; In
re Betty C., 632 P.2d 412, 414 (Okla. 1981); In re Daniel, H., 591 P.2d 1175, 1177-78 (Okla. 1979).
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IV. NECESSITY FOR GUARANTEE OF ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS UNTIL PARENT-INITIATED TERMINATION
PROCEEDINGS ARE ABOLISHED
In recent years, the Oklahoma courts and legislature have confirmed
the rights of parents threatened with termination of parental rights to
several important procedural protections in juvenile proceedings.
Among these are the parent's right to a jury trial, the right to court-
appointed counsel if the parent is indigent, and the right to an elevated
standard of proof. The courts and legislature have also confirmed the
right of the child to appointment of independent counsel. In addition,
juvenile proceedings normally require extensive investigation by profes-
sionals prior to the termination determination. However, these same
protections have not been addressed by the Oklahoma courts and legisla-
ture in the context of parent-initiated proceedings. This disparity com-
pounds the risk that the child's welfare will not be protected in parent-
initiated proceedings. 2"
A. Right to Jury Trial
In 1987, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in R.E. v. State (In re
A.E.)2 1 determined that a parent threatened with termination of paren-
tal rights in the dispositional hearing of a juvenile proceeding has a right
to trial by jury mandated by the Oklahoma Constitution, article 2, sec-
tion 19, and the Oklahoma Juvenile Code.242 The court specifically de-
clined to decide whether a parent threatened with termination in a
parent-initiated proceeding possessed the same right to a jury trial. The
majority based its recognition of the right to jury trial in juvenile pro-
ceedings on both the fundamental nature of the right subject to extinc-
tion, and on principles of constitutional and statutory construction and
240. See supra notes 137-213 and accompanying text.
241. 743 P.2d 1041, 1043-48 (Okla. 1987). The right to a jury in adjudicatory hearings is guar-
anteed by OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1110 (Supp. 1986), and is well recognized by the courts. J.V. v.
State (In re L.M.H.), 572 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Okla. 1977). In re A.E., however, overruled a line of
cases which previously held the right to jury trial did not apply to dispositional hearings, including
termination proceedings. See, e-g., Wilson v. Foster, 595 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Okla. 1979); In re
L.M.H., 572 P.2d at 1286.
242. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101-1506 (Supp. 1987). At least one other state recognizes a statu-
tory right to jury trial in a parental rights termination proceeding. LP v. Natrona County Dep't of
Pub. Assistance & Social Serv. (In re GP), 679 P.2d 976, 983 (Wyo. 1984) (state-initiated proceed-
ing). Several other states have no statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial in parental rights
termination proceedings. In re Baby Boy Bryant, 9 Kan. App. 2d 768, 689 P.2d 1203, 1209 (1984);
Mays v. Department for Human Resources, 656 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Rodriquez v.
Colon (In re Colon), 144 Mich. App. 805, 377 N.W.2d 321, 328 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
1989]
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history. While the former argument clearly applies equally to parent-
initiated termination proceedings, it is not as clear that the constitutional
and statutory construction is as readily transferable.
The majority in In re A.E. placed significant emphasis on the recog-
nition in numerous cases by both the United States Supreme Court and
the Oklahoma Supreme Court that a parent's right to the companion-
ship, care, and custody of his or her child is a fundamental right deserv-
ing heightened procedural protection.243 Applying principles of
procedural due process, the court proclaimed that the "opportunity to be
heard must be meaningful and appropriate to the nature of the interest
involved in the case," 2" and that "parental rights are too precious to be
terminated without the full panoply of protections afforded by the
Oklahoma Constitution.""24 The court further observed that recognition
of the right to jury trial would best achieve the primary goal of promot-
ing the best interests and welfare of the child.246 Because parent-initiated
termination proceedings extinguish the same fundamental right, and the
court is under a similar obligation to deny termination if it would be
detrimental to the child's welfare, due process compels that identical pro-
cedural protection be afforded.
The right to jury trial, however, has traditionally been premised on a
constitutional or statutory source of entitlement. In juvenile actions, the
right to jury trial in Oklahoma is supported by article 2, section 19 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, which was amended in 1969 specifically to pro-
vide for jury trials in "juvenile proceedings." The majority in In re A.E.
determined that termination proceedings instituted by the state under ti-
tle 10, section 1130 were juvenile proceedings within the meaning of the
Oklahoma Constitution.247
Although extending this argument to parent-initiated proceedings is
more problematic, an extension of the court's reasoning is not foreclosed.
While traditionally the term "juvenile proceedings" has referred to ac-
tions initiated by the state on behalf of children,248 the legislature chose
to authorize parents to initiate termination proceedings by amending sec-
tion 1130 of the Juvenile Code. Thus, it is arguable that since such pro-
ceedings are governed by the Juvenile Code, the term "juvenile
243. In re A.E., 743 P.2d at 1044, 1047-48.
244. Id. at 1047.
245. Id. at 1048.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1046-48.
248. See Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1105-06 (Okla. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in
L.RR. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94, 100 n.18 (Okla. 1988).
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proceedings" as used in the Oklahoma Constitution should be construed
broadly to afford the right to jury trial to litigants in parent-initiated ter-
mination proceedings.
This construction is supported by the fact that any other construc-
tion would appear to violate the rights of procedural due process and
equal protection that must be afforded to parents threatened with loss of
fundamental parental rights in parent-initiated proceedings. As dis-
cussed above, procedural due process, guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution, requires that the funda-
mental nature of a right in jeopardy strongly favors heightened proce-
dural protections.249 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment further requires that review by a jury cannot be made avail-
able to litigate certain rights and then be arbitrarily withheld from a sub-
group litigating the same issues.250 In Wilson v. Foster, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court recognized that the federal equal protection clause, as
well as article 5, section 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution, precluded af-
fording trial by jury to parents in juvenile adjudicatory hearings but de-
nying jury trial to divorced parents whose juvenile hearings had been
combined with post-divorce motions filed by the other parent, when no
real and substantial distinctions existed between the two groups.251 As
the dissenters in In re A.E. forcefully argued, there is similarly no ra-
tional basis for providing the right to jury trial to parents threatened with
termination in juvenile dispositional hearings but denying it to parents
risking the same loss in actions initiated by the other parent.252  The
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and article 5,
sections 4623 and 59254 of the Oklahoma Constitution forbid such une-
qual treatment. The Oklahoma Constitution, therefore, must either be
249. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 (1982).
250. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). (In
both cases, the Court held that where jury trial was available in commitment proceedings it cannot
arbitrarily be withheld from ex-convicts.).
251. Wilson v. Foster, 595 P.2d 1329, 1332-33 (Okla. 1979)(In Wilson, the noncustodial father's
motion for change in custody was consolidated with a juvenile proceeding initiated by the state
against the mother.), overruled on other grounds R.E. v. State (In re A.E.), 743 P.2d 1041 (Okla.
1987). See supra note 241.
252. R.E. v. State (In re A.E.), 743 P.2d 1041, 1051 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., dissenting).
253. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 46, provides in pertinent part: "The Legislature shall not, except as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing: Regulating the
practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings or inquiry before
the courts .... ." Id.
254. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59, provides: "Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
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construed or amended to guarantee the right to jury trial to parents de-
fending both juvenile and parent-initiated termination proceedings. Ab-
sent such a construction or amendment, this unconstitutional disparity in
procedural protection provides yet another reason to abolish parent-initi-
ated termination proceedings.
B. Right of Indigent Parents to Court-Appointed Counsel
In title 10, section 1109 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the legislature
has guaranteed to indigent parents the right to court-appointed counsel
"if a petition has been ified alleging that the child is a deprived child, a
child in need of supervision, or a child in need of treatment, or if termi-
nation of parental rights is a possible remedy."25 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has further recognized in In re Chad S., a juvenile pro-
ceeding, that procedural due process imposes an obligation upon the
court in a termination proceeding to advise indigent parents of their right
to court-appointed counsel.256
The language of both title 10, section 1109 and its counterpart, title
10, section 24, suggests that the statutory right to court-appointed coun-
sel is applicable to indigent parents threatened with termination in par-
ent-initiated proceedings as well as in juvenile proceedings. The fact that
the legislature describes those actions "in which termination of parental
rights is a possible remedy" as a separate category from deprived actions
leaves room to construe section 1109 as requiring appointment of counsel
in all termination proceedings, including parent-initiated proceedings.
Although section 1109 is part of the Juvenile Code, which pertains
mostly to state-initiated proceedings, section 1130 of the Juvenile Code
255. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1109(b) (Supp. 1986) provides:
B. If the parents, guardian, or other legal custodian of the child requests an attorney and
is found to be without sufficient financial means, counsel shall be appointed by the court if
a petition has been filed alleging that the child is a deprived child, a child in need of super-
vision, or a child in need of treatment, or if termination of parental rights is a possible
remedy, provided that the court may appoint counsel without such request, if it deems
representation by counsel necessary to protect the interest of the parents, guardian or other
legal custodian. If the child is not otherwise represented by counsel, whenever a petition is
filed pursuant to the provisions of Section 1103 of this title, the court shall appoint a sepa-
rate attorney, who shall not be a district attorney, for the child regardless of any attempted
waiver by the parent or other legal custodian of the child of the right of the child to be
represented by counsel.
Id.
256. In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 985-86 (Okla. 1978).
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authorizes parent-initiated termination proceedings. Moreover, addi-
tional statutory authority mandating court-appointed counsel for indi-
gent parents who desire counsel is found in title 10, section 24.257
Section 24 is not limited to juvenile proceedings and appears in the first
chapter of title 10, entitled General Provisions, rather than in the Juve-
nile Code. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Chad S. recognized
both section 1109(b) and section 24(a) as statutory authority mandating
the appointment of counsel for indigent parties to a termination proceed-
ing. Thus, a strong argument can be made that indigent parents subject
to termination in parent-initiated proceedings have a statutory right to
court-appointed counsel.258
Recognition of a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in
parent-initiated proceedings is also appropriate. Although the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's initial recognition of a constitutional right to court-ap-
pointed counsel was based upon federal precedent which has now been
overturned,259 the due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution2"
provides ample authority to support the continued viability of the re-
quirement that counsel be appointed for indigent parents. Moreover, the
decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court is clearly the more enlightened
approach and has been widely adopted by other states.26 1
257. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 24 (1981) provides:
(a) When it appears to the court that the minor or his parent or guardian desires counsel
but is indigent and cannot for that reason employ counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.
In any case in which it appears to the court that there is such a conflict of interest between
a parent or guardian and child that one attorney could not properly represent both, the
court may appoint counsel, in addition to counsel already employed by a parent or guard-
ian or appointed by the court to represent the minor or parent or guardian, provided that
in all counties having public defenders, said public defenders shall assume the duties of
representation in proceedings such as above.
(b) In all cases other than in counties where public defenders are appointed, the court
shall, where counsel is appointed and assigned allow and direct to be paid by the county in
which the proceedings or trial is held, out of the court fund of said county, a reasonable
and just compensation to the attorney or attorneys for such services as they may render.
Provided, that such attorney shall not be paid a sum to exceed One Hundred Dollars
($100.00) for services rendered in preliminary proceedings, and such compensation shall
not exceed Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) for services rendered during trial.
Id.
258. In re Chad S., 580 P.2d at 985.
259. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981), reh'g denied, 453 U.S.
927 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Federal Consti-
tution does not require the right to court-appointed counsel be afforded to indigent parents in every
case involving termination of parental tights, but instead the existence of a due process right must be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
260. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." Id.
261. See, eg., V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1983) (due process right to court-appointed
counsel in termination proceeding based on Alaska Constitution); Rodriguez v. Padilla, (In re Rodri-
guez), 34 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973) (recognition of right under United States
61
Blair: Parent-Initiated Termination of Parental Rights: The Ultimate Wea
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:299
Procedural due process analysis requires balancing the private inter-
ests at stake, the probable value of the additional procedure at issue in
reducing the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest, and the
governmental interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
the additional procedural requirement would entail.262 In both parent-
initiated and juvenile proceedings, the private interests at stake, i.e., the
benefits to be derived by both parent and child from continuation of the
parental relationship, are fundamental intrinsic human rights deserving
the highest procedural protection.263 In addition, counsel for a parent
threatened with termination of parental rights is equally necessary in ju-
venile and parent-initiated proceedings to reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivation. Attorneys serve a vital function in investigating and
presenting information a lay person would not perceive as relevant.
Moreover, the issues to be resolved in parent-initiated termination ac-
tions involve questions of willful behavior and the best interests of the
child. Such questions require more than readily obtainable objective
facts 26 and should involve direct and cross-examination of expert wit-
nesses.2 6' Defending a termination action necessitates expertise, experi-
ence, and skill on the part of the examiner, as well as a thorough
Constitution); In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987) (due process
right to counsel based on both United States and Florida Constitutions); Chambers v. District Court,
261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967); In re Johnson, No. CJ 84 0952, slip op. at 6 (La. Ct. App. Feb.
26, 1985); Danforth v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973) (right to counsel
based on United States and Maine Constitutions in juvenile proceeding to remove child from par-
ent's custody); Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge, 396 Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55 (1976) (right to
counsel based on United States and Michigan Constitutions); Department of Social Servs. v. Trow-
bridge (In re Trowbridge), 155 Mich. App. 785, 401 N.W.2d 65 (1986); B.L.E. v. Elmore, 723
S.W.2d 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Caha, 190 Neb. 347, 208 N.W.2d 259 (1973); Crist v.
Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974), aff'd and modified, 135 N.J. Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975)
(Affirmed right to counsel and modified regarding source of compensation for appointed attorneys);
Kurtis v. Jeri B. (In re Ella B.), 30 N.Y.2d 352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 285 N.E.2d 288 (1972); In re
Reed, No. L-87-374, slip. op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 13, 1988) (right to counsel found in Federal
and Ohio Constitutions); State v. Jamison, 251 Or. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968); In re Adoption of R.I.,
455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1032 (1977); Depart-
ment of Human Servs. v. Pepper, No. 85-292-IL, slip. op. (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1986) (right to
appointed counsel on appeal under circumstances of case); In re Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d
135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974) (right to counsel based on Federal and Washington Constitutions); State ex
rel Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974). Cf In re Clark, 281 S.E.2d 47 (N.C. 1981)
(In action in which parent did have court-appointed counsel, failure of act, prior to its recent amend-
ment to require court-appointed counsel, did not render it constitutionally defective.).
262. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
263. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. This was acknowledged even in the majority
opinion in Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
264. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1987).
265. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30. See infra notes 313-23 and accompanying text.
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knowledge of both substantive and evidentiary law. In 1966, the Colum-
bia Journal of Law and Social Problems conducted a survey of family
court judges in Kings County, New York. The survey reported that
66.7% of the judges responding indicated that respondent's lack of repre-
sentation by counsel in neglect proceedings hindered the court's develop-
ment of the facts. The survey also reported that 72.2% stated that
without counsel it was more difficult to conduct a fair hearing and pro-
tect respondent's rights.2 66 In the same study, it was discovered that
findings of neglect and placements outside the home occurred signifi-
cantly more frequently when respondent parents were unrepresented.267
Although the argument has been made in juvenile proceedings that
the risk of erroneous deprivation may be especially great when an indi-
vidual opposes the state,268 a similar disparity exists when the initiating
parent is represented and the defending parent is not. The attorney for
266. Note, Representation in Child-Neglect Case" Are Parents Neglected?, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 230, 235 (1968).
267. Id. at 241-43. The study determined that 79.5% of the cases in which the parents were
unrepresented resulted in findings of neglect, as compared to 62.5% in cases where the parents were
represented throughout the proceeding. Absence of an attorney had an even greater effect at the
disposition stage as the following summary of their findings indicates:
Parents Represented Parents
by Counsel Unrepresented
Disposition Throughout Proceedings by Counsel
Children placed outside the home. 18.2% 40.6%
Discharged under court supervision. 45.4% 39.6%
Discharged without court supervision. 9.1% 5.0%
Petition dismissed after findings. 9.1% 3.0%
Other. 18.2% 11.8%
Id.
Regarding the results of this survey, one commentator observed:
Since there is no evidence indicating that the average respondent who can retain counsel is
better or less neglectful than one who cannot, the conclusion seems inescapable that a
significant number of cases against unrepresented parents result in findings of neglect solely
because of the absence of counsel. In other words, assuming a basic faith in the adversary
system as a method of bringing the truth to light, a significant number of neglect findings
(followed in many cases by a taking of the child from his parents) against unrepresented
indigents are probably erroneous. It would be hard to think of a system of law which
works more to the oppression of the poor than the denial of appointed counsel to indigents
in neglect proceedings.
Note, Child Neglect: Due Process for the Parent, 70 COLUM. L. Rtv. 465, 476 (1970). See Crist v.
Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J. Supp. 402, 320 A.2d 203, 208-09 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1974) (court relied upon survey and above note in recognizing due process right to court-
appointed counsel), affid and modified, 135 N.J. Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975).
268. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (juvenile proceeding in which United States
Supreme Court recognized that due process required that the allegations in a termination proceeding
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence).
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the initiating parent will be far more familiar with the substantive, evi-
dentiary, and procedural issues to be encountered than an unrepresented
parent defending a termination action. The attorney will also be more
skilled in developing the expert testimony that should be required.269
Finally, the governmental interest in promoting the welfare of the
child, equally present regardless of who initiates the proceedings, 270 is
best served by ensuring that counsel represents both the initiating and
defending parties to achieve an accurate and just decision. 271 The gov-
ernment also has an interest, in both juvenile and parent-initiated pro-
ceedings, in minimizing administrative costs. Nevertheless, as the
United States Supreme Court,272 the Oklahoma Supreme Court273 and
legislature,274 and the majority of other states275 have determined, the
private interests of parent and child are far more significant than the
state's pecuniary interest in avoiding the cost of compensation to court-
appointed attorneys. Moreover, when the state authorizes a private
party to undertake functions traditionally reserved to the state,276 the
state must bear the relatively minor additonal cost of extending the same
procedural protections to the defendants that exist if the state were bring-
ing the action. In sum, regardless of whether the proceeding is initiated
by the state or the other parent, due process entitles indigent parents
defending termination proceedings to a court-appointed attorney. If in-
digent defendants in parent-initiated proceedings are not being appointed
counsel, then one more reason exists to abolish parent-initiated
proceedings.
269. See infra notes 313-23 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
271. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67 ("As parens patriae, the State's goal is to provide the child
with a permanent home.... Yet while there is still reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-
child relationships exist, the parens patriae interest favors preservation, not severance, of natural
familial bonds."); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 ("Since the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of
the child, it shares the parent's interest in an accurate and just decision.").
272. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28 ("But though the State's pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly
significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here, particularly in light of
the concession in the respondent's brief that the 'potential costs of appointed counsel in termination
proceedings ... is [sic] admittedly de minimus compared to the costs in all criminal actions.' ").
273. See In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 986 (Okla. 1978).
274. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 24 (1981), 1109(b) (Supp. 1986).
275. See supra note 261. In Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34, the Court observed that 33 states and the
District of Columbia provided statutorily for the appointment of counsel in termination cases. See
also Parker, supra note 21, at 594 n.222.
276. See Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1108 n.24 and 1111 (Okla. 1985), superseded by statute
as stated in L.R.R. v. R.D.R. (In re R.R.R.), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988).
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C. Right to Impose an Elevated Burden of Proof on Party Seeking
Termination
Both the United States Supreme Court, in Santosky v. Kramer,
2 77
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in In re C. G.,278 have held that proce-
dural due process requires that the party seeking termination must prove
the allegations necessary to terminate parental rights by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Although both Santosky and In re C. G. 279 addressed
the issue in the context of juvenile actions, the underlying rationale ap-
plies equally well to parent-initiated proceedings. Both courts empha-
sized the fundamental nature of the private interests at stake for both the
defending parent and the child.28° Moreover, the government's interest
in protecting children281 is present in both types of proceedings, as is the
less significant pecuniary interest in minimizing cost to the state.282
While examining the risk of erroneous deprivation, the United
States Supreme Court in Santosky buttressed its recognition of the ele-
vated standard by observing the disparity in resources between an indi-
vidual defendant and the state. The agency, which had no predetermined
limits restricting the sums it could spend prosecuting, employed an attor-
ney expert in the field and a social worker who investigated the family.
2 83
In reality, however, the differences between state- and parent-initiated
proceedings are far less striking than the similarities. In many instances,
a parent seeking termination of the other parent's rights may have sig-
nificant resources and far more ability to invest them in prosecuting a
termination action than an overworked district attorney with a huge
277. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
278. 637 P.2d 66, 70 (Okla. 1981). (The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that the elevated
standard was required by the due process clause of the OKLA. CONsT., art. II, § 7. See note 260 for
full text.).
279. Although the proceeding in In re C.G. was a juvenile proceeding prosecuted by the state,
the court noted it was unclear from the record whether the grandparents as custodians or the De-
partment of Human Services was the moving party in the termination proceeding. 637 P.2d at 68,
n.2.
280. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59; In re C.G., 637 P.2d at 70-71 ("The clear and convincing
standard balances the parent's fundamental freedom from family disruption with the state's duty to
protect children within its borders. It places an appropriately heavy burden upon the § 1130 peti-
tioner (termination-seeking party) to overcome the law's policy which identifies the child's best inter-
ests with that of its natural parents.").
281. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; In re C.G., 637 P.2d at 70-71.
282. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
283. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
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caseload.284 Private parties, as well as the state, can retain expert wit-
nesses and attorneys who specialize in family and juvenile law. The ad-
vantage that the state may have in juvenile proceedings because the child
is usually in state custody28 5 is paralleled by the fact that parent-initiated
proceedings are usually initiated by the custodial parent.286 Moreover,
other factors examined in Santosky affecting the allocation of risk are
identical for both state- and parent-initiated proceedings. Imprecise sub-
stantive standards which leave determinations open to the unusual dis-
cretion and subjective values of the judge28 7 are applied in both state- and
parent-initiated proceedings, which utilize some of the same grounds. 288
Parents defending termination actions against the state or another parent
may be subject to repeated termination efforts.289 Of paramount impor-
tance, however, is the fact that in both state- and parent-initiated pro-
ceedings, a standard that equally allocates the risk of error between
termination and failure to terminate does not reflect the relative severity
of the consequences.2 90 The Court in Santosky observed that in juvenile
proceedings, erroneous failure to terminate results in preservation of the
child in foster care, an "uneasy status quo," whereas erroneous termina-
tion results in unnecessary destruction of the natural family.291 In par-
ent-initiated proceedings, erroneous failure to terminate should have no
detrimental effects for the child, who is likely to remain in the initiating
parent's custody. Erroneous termination, on the other hand, unnecessa-
rily deprives both parent and child of the benefits of the parental relation-
ship.292 Thus, there is at least as great a need, if not a greater need, for
an elevated standard of proof in parent-initiated termination proceedings
to reduce the risk of erroneous termination.
Fortunately, in Oklahoma there is every indication that the courts
will impose the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence upon
parents initiating termination actions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
has already declared that in adoption proceedings initiated by private
284. For example, in 1987 two district attorneys in Tulsa county assigned to the Juvenile Bureau
handled 6,924 referrals. Of the referrals, 1,990 cases were actually filed in 1987, giving each a
caseload of approximately 995 for the year. Telephone interview with Stephen Rouse, District At-
torney, Tulsa County Juvenile Bureau, (October 10, 1988).
285. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
286. See supra note 27.
287. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762.
288. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1987). See supra notes 24, 33 & 58 and accompanying
text.
289. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764.
290. Id. at 765-66.
291. Id. at 765-66.
292. See supra notes 137-70 and accompanying text.
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parties, the clear and convincing evidence standard of persuasion "must
be met to warrant judicial severance of the parental bond," due to the
fundamental nature of parental rights.29 3 There is some evidence that
the lower courts have followed this cue in parent-initiated termination
proceedings. In Yarborough v. Yarborough,294 the only parent-initiated
action which refers to the standard of proof, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court observed that the trial court had applied the clear and convincing
evidence standard.
D. Right of the Child to Court-Appointed Counsel
The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined in In re T.M.H.1295 that
children involved in termination proceedings have a statutory right to
court-appointed independent counsel. The statutory authority and ra-
tionale upon which the court relied confirm unmistakably that this right
extends to parent-initiated termination proceedings. The court found
that appointment of counsel for children was mandated by both title 10,
section 1109(b)296 of the Juvenile Code, which provides for appointment
of counsel for a child in proceedings "wherein termination of parental
rights is a possible remedy," and title 10, section 24,297 which, from its
placement in the chapter on General Provisions, apparently applies to all
actions relating to children. As discussed above in the context of a par-
ent's right to counsel,298 these statutes are clearly intended to include
parent-initiated termination proceedings as well as those initiated by the
state.
In In re TM.H., the court observed that the statutes guaranteed a
child court-appointed counsel when requested, when it appeared to the
court that it was necessary to protect the interests of the child,29 9 or
when a conflict of interest existed between a parent or guardian and the
293. In re C.M.G., 656 P.2d 262, 265 (Okla. 1982); In re Adoption of Darren Todd H., 615 P.2d
287, 290 (Okla. 1980). In Darren Todd the court observed that the standard of clear and convincing
evidence is used in other civil actions, including actions between private parties such as fraud ac-
tions, "where the interests at stake are deemed more substantial than mere loss of money." Id.
294. 708 P.2d 1100, 1101 (Okla. 1985).
295. 613 P.2d 468, 470-71 (Okla. 1980). Several other states also provide counsel for a child in
termination of parental rights hearings. For a recent list of statutory authorities from twenty states
providing for counsel for the child, see Parker, supra note 21, at 594 n.223. In addition, some states
provide for appointment of a guardian ad litem. Id. at 595, n.224.
296. See supra note 255 for full text of § 1109(b).
297. See supra note 257 for full text of § 24.
298. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
299. 613 P.2d at 469-70 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1109).
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child.3"° However, the court was convinced that "in all termination pro-
ceedings there are potential conflicts between the interests of the children
and those of both the state and the parents."30 1  Because this potential
conflict exists in all termination hearings, the court held that "independ-
ent counsel must be appointed to represent the children if termination of
parental rights is sought. ' 3°2 Although In re TM.H. was a juvenile pro-
ceeding, its holding did not appear to be limited to juvenile actions and
its rationale is equally applicable to parent-initiated proceedings. The
court observed that beneath each side's argument, made in terms of the
best interests of the child, lay the desire of counsel for the parties to
prevail for their client, who is not the child.30 3 Only an attorney for the
child can present and cross-examine witnesses with the sole interest of
promoting the welfare of the child.3 °4 If the court found that even the
attorneys for the state, whose ultimate goal is to protect the child,305 had
potential conflicts with the interests of the child, it is clear that the need
for independent counsel for the child is even greater when the litigants
are two parents, who clearly have personal interests which may conflict
with the child's. 306
Unfortunately, despite the clear application of both the underlying
statutes and the court's decision in In re T.M.H., the Oklahoma courts
have not uniformly appointed counsel in parent-initiated termination
hearings.30 7 Of the four termination cases308 instituted by a parent which
have reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court during the past three years,
300. Id. at 470 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 24 (Supp. 1987)).
301. Id. at 470-71 (emphasis added).
302. Id. at 471.
303. Id. at 470. In a California ethics opinion, the State Bar Committee on Professional Ethics
observed that an attorney for a parent in a custody proceeding does not represent the child's interest
and a significant conflict of interest exists between the parent and child, such that it would be a
breach of professional ethics for an attorney for a parent to suggest that counsel be appointed for the
child, under circumstances where such appointment would be unusual. Cal. St. Bar Comm. on Prof.
Ethics, Formal Opinion No. 1976-37, Reprinted in 1 CAL. FAM. L. REP. 1126 (1977).
304. In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468, 470 (Okla. 1980).
Many commentators have used similar arguments to support the need for independent counsel
for the child even in custody proceedings. Eg., Note, Custody Disputes Arising From Divorce; The
Child's Need for Counsel in Pennsylvania, 87 DICK. L. REv. 351 (1983); Watson, The Children of
Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRAcusE L. REv. 55 (1969); See Inker &
Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 Mass. L.A. 229 (1970); Landsman &
Minow, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes
Arising From Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126 (1978).
305. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Okla. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in L.R.R.
v. R.D.R (In re R.R.R), 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988). See supra notes 122-23, 126-28.
306. See supra notes 226-39.
307. The Oklahoma courts also do not yet appear to be appointing independent counsel for
children in adoption proceedings. See, eg., In re Adoption of J.L.H., 737 P.2d 915 (Okla. 1987); In
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it appears from the opinions that counsel was appointed for the child in
only one case, Yarborough v. Yarborough.30 9 It is interesting to note that
of the four cases, only in Yarborough does the opinion's summary of the
record disclose any consideration by the trial judge regarding whether
termination was in the best interests of the minor child.310 Failure to
appoint independent counsel for a child involved in parent-initiated ter-
mination proceedings further increases the significant risk that termina-
tion will be allowed when it fails to serve the interests of the child311 and
will in fact be used inappropriately to accomplish other purposes.312
E. Necessity for Independent Expert Testimony
Termination of parental rights in juvenile proceedings normally
takes place only after extensive investigation has been conducted by so-
cial workers employed by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services
and a civilian review board.31 3 This investigation frequently involves
re Adoption of A.G.K., 728 P.2d I (Okla. Ct. App. 1986). In neither case does an attorney for the
child appear as counsel of record for the minor child.
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not directly decided the issue of whether a child
has the statutory right to appointment of independent counsel in adoptions, the majority in Davis,
708 P.2d at I 110, observed in dicta that in proceedings for adoption without consent under OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 60.6, counsel for the child is not required. No authority was cited in support of this
statement, however, and it should be observed that Justice Opala, who wrote the majority opinion in
Davis, dissented in In re T.M.H. and expressed strong disagreement with the requirement that coun-
sel must be appointed to represent children in every case brought under OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130.
308. In re McNeely, 734 P.2d 1294 (Okla. 1987); Griffith v. Griffth,730 P.2d 524 (Okla. 1986);
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 708 P.2d 1100 (Okla. 1985); Davis, 708 P.2d 1102.
309. Yarborough, 708 P.2d at 1101.
310. Id. Even in Yarborough, it appears this was not considered until the original order termi-
nating the father's rights was vacated following a motion for a new trial and the case was reopened to
consider in an evidentiary hearing whether the best interests of the child would be served by severing
the parental rights. The opinion does not indicate at what stage the counsel for the child was
appointed.
311. See supra notes 171-213.
312. See supra notes 214-39.
313. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1115 (1981) (At dispositional hearing court may consider oral and
written reports and adjourn hearing to receive reports); Id. § 1115.1 (Supp. 1983) (Department must
prepare placement plan for any child placed outside the home, including inter alia, history of child
and family, statement of conditions to be alleviated and methods to be used to correct conditions or
achieve permanent placement, special programs available to child and parent, and conduct expected
of parent prior to child's return home); Id. § 1116.1 (Supp. 1983) (requirement that the department
prepare a report for each review hearing, every six months after removal of deprived child from
home, containing summary of physical, mental and emotional condition of child, the conditions of
the foster home, efforts of the parents to correct problems, and recommendations for further disposi-
tion; requirement that court must inquire as to extent of casework services being given parent and
child; provision that attorney for child may also submit a report at each review hearing); Id. § 1116.3
(Supp. 1983) (requirement that citizen review boards appointed by judge review the case of every
deprived child in placement every six months and submit findings and recommendations to the court
regarding appropriateness of goals and objectives of placement plan and services provided to child
and parent); Id. § 1135 (Supp. 1986) (requirement that Department of Human Services review and
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obtaining medical or psychological evaluations.314 Reports on this inves-
tigation are then considered by the court in determining whether termi-
nation is in the best interests of the child.315
Currently, there is no statutory requirement of independent expert
testimony in parent-initiated termination proceedings. However, the
need for expert evaluation is particularly critical if these actions continue
to be allowed. The use of expert evaluation in inter-parental custody
disputes has become commonplace and is increasingly regarded as essen-
tial.31 6 Since custody determinations are always modifiable,317 obviously
the need for expert evaluation is far more critical in termination proceed-
ings in which the parental bond is completely severed and the decision to
terminate is final.318 If it becomes apparent that termination was not in
the child's best interests, neither the child nor the terminated parent may
seek modification of the decision.319
The likelihood that parent-initiated actions could be misused as
sanctions 320 or vehicles to serve the parents' needs321 magnifies the need
for independent expert evaluation to determine whether termination is
truly necessary to protect a child from harm and would serve the child's
best interests. Because termination has such a devastating impact on a
assess each child committed to it to determine appropriate placement, which review must include an
investigation of the personal and family history of the child, his environment, and any physical or
mental examinations that are necessary.).
314. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1120 (Supp. 1986) (provision for court-ordered examination of child
by physician or qualified mental health professional); Id. § 1135 (Supp. 1986) (provision for Depart-
ment of Human Services to obtain any physical or mental examinations considered necessary for a
child committed to custody of the Department).
315. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1115(a) (1981).
316. See Litwack, Gerber & Fenster, The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody Disputes,
18 . FAM. L. 269, 282-300 (1979-80); Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody
Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 77 (1969). Contra Okpaker, Psychology, Impediment
orAid in Child Custody Cases, 29 RUTGERS L. RaV. 1117 (1976).
317. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277 (Supp. 1987). See supra note 139.
318. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1118 (1981) provides: "Any decree or order made under the provi-
sions of this title may be modified by the court at any time; provided, however, that an order termi-
nating parental rights or an order certifying the juvenile as an adult may not be modified." Id.
319. Id. In rare instances a parent whose rights had been terminated could seek to adopt back
his or her own child. To do so, however, the parent must fall within a category of persons eligible to
adopt, set forth in § 60.3 (1981), and either obtain the consent of the child's legal parent(s) or prove
that grounds exist under § 60.6 (Supp. 1986) to adopt without their consent. Because the effect of
this adoption would be to terminate the rights of the legal parent(s), unless the adoptive parent is
married to the only legal parent at the time of the adoption; and because the legal parent would
normally be the one who sought termination in the first place, it is extremely unlikely that adoption
by a terminated parent would occur following parent-initiated termination.
320. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
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child's emotional and psychological well-being,322 at least one independ-
ent expert should be an experienced child psychologist or psychiatrist
experienced at working with children of divorced parents. This level of
expertise is needed because the expert must be capable of assessing
whether continuation of the parental relationship constitutes a threat to
the child that could not be alleviated by less restrictive means, 323 such as
restriction or termination of visitation, and must have sufficient training
in child development to forsee the psychological and emotional impact
termination will have upon the child in later years.
While the parties may choose to employ their own experts, it is im-
portant that the court appoint an independent expert who will not be
influenced by the desires of either party.324 Compensation to this expert
could be assessed as costs at the end of the proceeding, although the state
may ultimately bear the burden of this cost if the parent to whom the
cost should be assessed is indigent.
As long as the state allows parents to seek a remedy with such dras-
tic consequences, it must provide procedures which afford defending par-
ents their statutory and constitutional due process rights, and guarantee
children affected that advocates and independent professional experts
will be provided to attempt to focus the proceedings on the need to pro-
tect them from harm and promote their best interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Parent-initiated proceedings to terminate parental rights, whether
voluntary or involuntary, should be abolished. Such proceedings are
constitutionally defective from the perspective of both a parent whose
rights are involuntarily terminated and the child, each of whom possess
fundamental interests in the benefits of an ongoing relationship. More-
over, because parent-initiated proceedings fail to serve the child's needs
and offer the child no compensatory benefit, they contravene a funda-
mental policy long-endorsed by the Oklahoma courts and legislature that
termination should never be allowed unless it serves the best interests of
the child.
Involuntary termination of parental rights in actions initiated by the
other parent cannot withstand the strict judicial scrutiny mandated by
322. See supra notes 177-210 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 136-70 and accompanying text.
324. See Swann, The Dangers in Using Court-Appointed Experts in Child Custody Cases, THE
JUDGES JOURNAL 17 (Winter 1988).
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substantive due process when a fundamental right is extinguished. The
circumstances under which these proceedings are initiated, and the per-
missible statutory grounds for bringing them, indicate that termination
in this context is unnecessary to protect a child from harm. Under some
circumstances, the statute is grossly overinclusive. More importantly,
any legitimate concerns regarding the child's welfare that parent-initiated
termination could address can be remedied by less restrictive alternatives
under current Oklahoma law.
Because a child also has fundamental interests that emanate from
the parental bond, recognition and heightened constitutional protection
must be extended to the right of the child to preservation of the parent-
child relationship when continuation of the relationship promotes' the
child's welfare. Parent-initiated termination actions, whether voluntary
or involuntary, violate this constitutional right because such proceedings
fail to serve the child's best interests. Termination deprives the child of
the right to future financial support and exposes the child to a significant
risk of psychological and emotional damage by abolishing the right of
visitation. Because adoption is not the immediate goal of parent-initiated
termination, normally no one is waiting to assume the responsibilities of
the terminated parent. Thus, the child realizes no benefit to compensate
for the detrimental effects of parent-initiated termination.
The Oklahoma courts and legislature have consistently maintained
that in custody matters and juvenile proceedings, the court's duty and
paramount concern is to serve the best interests of the child. Parent-
initiated termination proceedings thus contravene a fundamental princi-
ple of family law and frustrate the underlying rationale for the state's
intervention in familial relationships.
Although termination is only justified when it serves a child's best
interests and is necessary to protect the child, the statutory provisions for
parent-initiated termination create the risk that termination will be used
simply to sanction a parent for willful failure to pay support. Use of
termination as a sanction violates the parent's constitutional rights be-
cause less restrictive alternatives for punishment are available. Perhaps
the greater injustice, however, is that termination in the context of par-
ent-initiated proceedings punishes the parent at the expense of the child.
Finally, providing parents the opportunity to initiate termination
proceedings, whether voluntary or involuntary, creates a substantial risk
that termination will be employed to serve the emotional or financial
needs of the parent(s) rather than the child. The negative consequences
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of termination for the child and the absence of any overriding benefit
compel the conclusion that retention of parent-initiated termination pro-
ceedings to satisfy a parent's personal needs is unjustifiable.
Thus, constitutional and public policy considerations dictate that
the statutory grant of authority to parents to initiate termination pro-
ceedings should be eliminated. If this is not immediately accomplished,
the Oklahoma courts and legislature must take several measures to guar-
antee adequate procedural protections in parent-initiated proceedings.
First, the ambiguity in section 1130 must be resolved by requiring,
through amendment or judicial pronouncement, that termination of pa-
rental rights can be ordered only after the trial court makes a specific
judicial finding that termination is in the best interests of the child, re-
gardless of who initiates the action. Second, the right to jury trial, cur-
rently recognized for parents threatened with termination in a juvenile
proceeding, should be afforded defendants in parent-initiated proceed-
ings. Third, indigent parents defending parent-initiated termination ac-
tions must be guaranteed a right to court-appointed counsel. Fourth, the
party seeking termination must be required to establish the necessary al-
legations by clear and convincing evidence. Fifth and of particular im-
portance, the court must ensure the appointment of independent counsel
for every child whose parental bond is threatened in parent-initiated ac-
tions, a right currently afforded children in juvenile termination proceed-
ings. Finally, in every parent-initiated termination proceeding, the court
should require that an independent expert-a child psychologist or psy-
chiatrist-conduct an assessment of the need for termination and
whether termination is in the best interests of the child.
Provision of these procedural protections, however, will not cure the
constitutional defects or policy problems with parent-initiated termina-
tion. Absence of these protections merely compounds the deficiencies of
parent-initiated proceedings and increases the risk that termination in
such proceedings will be used for inappropriate purposes.
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